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I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 9, 2016, the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) announced that Ireland’s constitutional 
prohibition on abortion violated its obligations under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).1 While 
the HRC had found in 2005 that Peru violated the ICCPR for not 
ensuring a young woman’s access to a legal abortion, the 2016 case 
marked the first time the Committee based its view of an ICCPR 
violation on a state party’s domestic laws.2 Pro-choice advocates 
heralded the decision as a landmark victory that would require 
Ireland to legalize abortion in contradiction of its own constitution,3 
which “acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due 
regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws 
to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and 
vindicate that right.”4 On March 17, 2017, in a case that closely 
resembled the 2016 decision, the HRC again declared that Ireland’s 
restrictions on abortion violate the country’s obligations under the 
ICCPR.5 It was a bold move for the Committee—a body of eighteen 
                                                 
 1 U.N. Human Rights Comm., Mellet v. Ireland, Commc’n No. 
2324/2013, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 (2016), https://www. 
reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/CCPR-C-116-D-
2324-2013-English-cln-auv.pdf [hereinafter Mellet v. Ireland]. 
 2 CENTER FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, IRELAND MUST LEGALIZE 
ABORTION TO END VIOLATIONS OF WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS (2006), 
https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/G
LP_Europe_MelletvIreland_FS_09%2006_Web.pdf. 
 3 Id; see also Amelia Gentlemen, UN Calls on Ireland to Reform Abortion Laws 
After Landmark Ruling, THE GUARDIAN (June 9, 2016, 1:04 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/09/ireland-abortion-laws-
violated-human-rights-says-un (quoting Colm O’Gorman, Executive Director of 
Amnesty International Ireland as saying, “The Irish government must act promptly. 
Ireland’s constitution is no excuse. It must be changed to allow the reforms 
required by this ruling.”). 
 4 Constitution of Ireland 1937 art. 40.3.3, as amended by the Eighth Am. 
(1983). 
 5 U.N. Human Rights Comm., Whelan v. Ireland, Commc’n No. 




2018 Pushing a Right to Abortion through the Backdoor 6:1 
73 
experts6 whose recommendations are not binding—to instruct a 
sovereign nation to change its domestic law on the basis of an 
inferred, rather than explicitly stated, right to abortion.7 
The HRC’s recent decisions raise concern for two principal 
reasons. First, the treaty monitoring body exceeded its mandate by 
asserting Ireland was obligated to fulfill a right that neither the 
ICCPR nor any other U.N. human rights treaty recognizes.8 In fact, 
the ICCPR and other U.N. human rights treaties are more easily 
interpreted to protect the rights of unborn human beings than a 
mother’s right to abortion,9 except in situations where the mother 
requires life-saving treatment that results in the loss of her child.10 
Second, the HRC’s determination that international law requires a 
member state to change its domestic laws on abortion arguably 
violates the U.N. Charter’s prohibition against intervention in matters 
that are exclusively within a state party’s national jurisdiction.11 
                                                 
2014_25970_E.pdf [hereinafter Whelan v. Ireland]. 
 6 Introduction, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER 
(OHCHR), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2018); Membership, OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HR 
Bodies/CCPR/Pages/Membership.aspx (last visited Feb. 19, 2018). 
 7 Christina Zampas & Jaime M. Gher, Abortion as a Human Right - 
International and Regional Standards, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249, 253 (2008) (stating, 
“Committees are not judicial bodies and their Concluding Observations are not 
legally binding.”); Michael Perlin, “God Said to Abraham/Kill Me a Son”: Why the 
Insanity Defense and the Incompetency Status Are Compatible with and Required by the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Basic Principles of Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 477, 479 (Perlin, Professor Emeritus of Law at 
N.Y.U., states, “[P]olicy pronouncements of U.N. treaty bodies, in the form of 
GCs [general comments] or recommendations, are not considered binding 
international law.”); see also Michael O′Flaherty, The Concluding Observations of United 
Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 27, 36 (2006) (“Arguments 
against granting binding status to concluding observations may also be derived 
from basic principles of due process of law.”). 
 8 See infra Parts II (discussing international law’s treatment of abortion) and 
III (discussing treaty interpretation and U.N. treaty monitoring body authority). 
 9 See infra Part IV (discussing the rights of the unborn in international law). 
 10 See text accompanying infra notes 63-65. 
 11 See text accompanying infra notes 30-32 and Part III. 
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The HRC is not the only U.N. treaty monitoring body that 
has sought to compel states parties to change their domestic laws to 
comply with an inferred right to abortion. The committees for the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and 
the Convention Against Torture have also leveled criticism at states 
parties for legislation that restricts abortion.12 In addition to treaty 
committees, several U.N. agencies and offices have repeatedly 
asserted a right to abortion on the basis of explicitly stated human 
rights.13 The fact that pro-choice organizations have been directly 
involved with the U.N.’s push to pressure states into liberalizing 
domestic abortion laws highlights the illegitimacy of these efforts.14 
While some states have conformed to the U.N.’s demands, numerous 
states have taken a firm stance against encroachments on their 
sovereign right to decide domestic law on this controversial matter.15 
In the spring of 2018, Ireland will vote in a referendum that will 
decide whether the nation will maintain its constitutional abortion 
                                                 
 12 See infra Parts II-III. 
 13 This paper focuses primarily on efforts by U.N. treaty monitoring bodies 
to infer a human right to abortion from rights explicitly provided for in U.N. 
human rights treaties. However, U.N. agencies and offices have also argued in 
favor of inferring a right to abortion from established human rights. See, e.g., infra 
notes 215, 279-80 and accompanying text (regarding U.N. special rapporteurs); infra 
notes 51, 120-26, and accompanying text (discussing the World Health 
Organization); infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (regarding the U.N. Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights); infra note 284 and accompanying 
text (concerning the U.N. Population Fund); note 287 and accompanying text 
(regarding the U.N. Assistant Secretary-General for Policy Coordination, 
Department of Social and Economic Affairs). Unqualified references to “the U.N.” 
refer to U.N. treaty monitoring bodies and the U.N. agencies and offices listed in 
parentheses in this footnote. 
 14 See infra Section III.C. 
 15 See generally Kelsey Zorzi, The Impact of the United Nations on National 
Abortion Laws, 65 CATH. U.L. REV. 409 (2015) (discussing the liberalization of 
abortion laws in Nepal, Belgium, Ethiopia, Chad, Columbia, Argentina, Peru, and 
potentially Chile); infra Section III.D. (describing state pushback against U.N. 
pressure to liberalize domestic abortion laws). 
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restrictions or take a new direction in line with the U.N.’s push for 
abortion liberalization.16 
A new approach to the issue of abortion in U.N. human 
rights treaties is in order. Given the range of state perspectives on 
abortion and rights of the unborn, as well as the U.N.’s problematic 
interpretations of human rights instruments, perhaps the best way to 
proceed is through the adoption of a treaty amendment or protocol 
that explicitly addresses these issues.17 Even though differences on 
these controversial matters would remain, such an instrument would 
clarify the various positions and prevent entities on either side of the 
abortion debate from unfairly pressuring states. 
Part II of this paper examines the question of whether 
international law recognizes a right to abortion, looking primarily at 
U.N. human rights treaties and, briefly, customary international law. 
Part III looks at principles of treaty interpretation and how U.N. 
treaty monitoring bodies have, in conjunction with pro-choice 
NGOs, deviated from these principles in their effort to assert a right 
to abortion by inference from established human rights and 
customary international law. Part IV of this paper then turns to the 
issue of whether international law recognizes rights of the unborn. 
Part V describes problems that have arisen from the non-legislative 
effort to infer a human right to abortion. Part VI then proposes 
treaty modification through amendment or, more likely, optional 
protocols to clarify states parties’ positions on abortion and rights of 
the unborn. 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW DOES NOT RECOGNIZE A RIGHT TO 
ABORTION 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
to which “all members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties,”18 
                                                 
 16 Ed O’Loughlin, Ireland to Hold Abortion Referendum Next Year, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/world/europe/ireland-
abortion-ban-referendum.html?wpmm=1&wpisrc= 
nl_daily202. 
 17 See infra Part VI. 
 18 U.N. Charter art. 93, ¶ 1. 
2018 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 6:1 
76 
is considered the authoritative statement on sources of international 
law.19 According to Article 38, the primary sources of international 
law are international treaties and customary international law.20 No 
U.N. human rights treaty speaks of a right to abortion, and, as 
discussed in infra Section II.B, neither does customary international 
law provide for such a right.21 Even pro-choice NGOs, such as 
Amnesty International and Center for Reproductive Rights, have 
affirmed that no legally binding global human rights instrument 
identifies a right to abortion.22 Accordingly, those who assert an 
                                                 
 19 Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(citing U.S. v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 100-103 (2d Cir. 2003) and Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 & n.8 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
 20 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(a)-(b), June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
 21 In a 2011 meeting of the U.N. General Assembly, Mr. Anand Grover, 
U.N. Special Rapporteur for Health, expressed that “it was important to recognize 
that there was no international law on the matter [of abortion].” Press Release, 
Several Aspects of Sexual, Reproductive Health - Providing Information, Using 
Contraception, Abortion - Should Be “Decriminalized,” Third Committee Told, 
U.N. Press Release GA/SHC/4018 (Oct. 24, 2011), https://www.un.org 
/press/en/2011/gashc4018.doc.htm. 
 22 See Zampas & Gher, supra note 7, at 250 (“The African Women′s 
Protocol is the only legally binding human rights instrument that explicitly 
addresses abortion as a human right and affirms that women′s reproductive rights 
are human rights.”); see also PIERO A. TOZZI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
RIGHT TO ABORTION 1 (2010), https://c-fam.org/wp-content/uploads/Intern 
ational-Law-and-the-Right-to-Abortion-FINAL.pdf (citing Amnesty International 
as saying, “There is no generally accepted right to abortion in international human 
rights law.” Amnesty International, ‘Women, Violence and Health,’ Feb. 18, 
2005.”). Tozzi notes that in 2007, Amnesty “abandon[ed] neutrality on the abortion 
issue.” Id. at n.1. Similarly, in 2003, the Center for Reproductive Rights [hereinafter 
CRR] made the following comment, which was entered into the U.S. Congressional 
Record: “We have been leaders in bringing arguments for a woman’s right to 
choose abortion within the rubric of international human rights. However, there is 
no binding hard norm that recognizes women’s right to terminate a pregnancy.” 
CENTER FOR FAMILY & HUMAN RIGHTS, WRITTEN CONTRIBUTION OF THE 
CENTER FOR FAMILY AND HUMAN RIGHTS TO THE GENERAL DISCUSSION ON THE 
PREPARATION FOR A GENERAL COMMENT ON ARTICLE 6 (RIGHT TO LIFE) OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 9 (June 12, 2015), 
http://studylib.net/doc/17701878/written-contribution-of-the-center-for-family-
and-human-r. In 2009, the CRR changed its position, though, as with the period of 
time between Amnesty’s positions, “Nothing had changed in the intervening years, 
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international right to abortion support their position by inference 
from rights stipulated in binding international agreements. The long-
term goal of this approach appears to be the creation of a customary 
international law right to abortion based on states’ positive responses 
to pressure from treaty monitoring bodies to relax their domestic 
abortion laws.23 
A discussion of abortion and rights of the unborn within the 
regional human rights systems is beyond the scope of this paper, 
which focuses primarily on U.N. human rights treaties and, briefly, 
customary international law as global sources of legally binding 
human rights norms. However, it bears mentioning that there is one 
exception to the otherwise non-existence of a right to abortion in 
international law: the African Women’s Protocol (Maputo Protocol), 
which was concluded within the African human rights system.24 As of 
June 2017, thirty-six out of fifty-four states parties to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights have ratified the Maputo 
Protocol, which obligates member states to protect a woman’s right 
to abortion “in cases of sexual assault, rape, incest, and where the 
continued pregnancy endangers the mental and physical health of the 
mother or the life of the mother or the foetus.”25 In contrast, within 
the Inter-American human rights system, the American Convention 
recognizes that human life begins at conception.26 
                                                 
either in customary law or in treaty law, to make the [original] statement no longer 
true.” Id. 
 23 See infra Section II.B. 
 24 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa, July 11, 2003, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6, 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/ [hereinafter Maputo 
Protocol],. The Protocol was adopted at a 2003 summit of the African Union in 
Maputo, Mozambique. Chi Mgbako & Laura A. Smith, Sex Work and Human Rights 
in Africa, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1178, 1202 (2010). As of June 2017, thirty-six out 
of fifty-four African nations have ratified the Maputo Protocol. See Ratification Table: 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa, AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/ratification/ (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2018). 
 25 Maputo Protocol, supra note 14, art. 14.2.c. 
 26 American Convention on Human Rights art. 4(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
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A. Inferring a Right to Abortion Under U.N. Treaties 
In her seminal book, Mobilizing for Human Rights, Harvard 
Professor Beth Simmons asks why a sovereign nation would bind 
itself to an international legal agreement regarding its treatment of its 
own nationals.27 She responds that, “[t]he primary reason is that the 
government anticipates its ability and willingness to comply.”28 As 
Professor Simmons explains, “[g]overnments participate in 
negotiations, sign drafts, and expend political capital on ratification in 
most cases because they support the treaty goals and generally want 
to implement them.”29 
The domestic laws of many countries prohibit or strictly limit 
a woman’s ability to terminate a pregnancy, and some explicitly 
recognize that the right to life begins at conception.30 These states did 
not anticipate an obligation to protect a right to abortion when they 
signed human rights treaties which make no mention of such a right. 
In fact, the legislative history of the relevant U.N. human rights 
treaties shows that states parties considered abortion to be a matter 
of national jurisdiction.31 Accordingly, U.N. efforts to assert a right to 
abortion and hold states accountable for violations of the inferred 
right arguably violate Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, which 
prohibits the U.N. from intervening in explicitly domestic matters of 
any state.32 
                                                 
 27 HURST HANNUM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS 
OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 70 (5th ed. 2011) (citing Beth Simmons, 
Mobilizing for Human Rights (2009)). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text. 
 31 See, e.g., David P. Stewart, Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 161, 178 (1998); Lainie Rutkow & Joshua T. 
Lozman, Suffer the Children?: A Call for United States Ratification of the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 161, 186 (2006) (stating 
that drafters of the Convention on the Rights of the Child sought to ensure the 
treaty’s neutrality on the matter of abortion). 
 32 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7. 
2018 Pushing a Right to Abortion through the Backdoor 6:1 
79 
Pro-choice advocates and the U.N., through numerous U.N. 
offices and agencies,33 have stated that a woman’s right to abortion is 
inferred from treaty-protected rights such as the right to life, the right 
to health, the right to be free from torture and from cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment, the right to privacy, and the 
right to be free from discrimination.34 However, as discussed in infra 
Part IV, the relevant U.N. human treaties arguably support 
application of these protections to the unborn, or at least, as 
indicated in the legislative history, leave the matter up to each state. 
Furthermore, while in some cases the U.N. treaty committee findings 
are influential, they are non-binding.35 Yet if treaty monitoring bodies 
succeed in convincing states that they are legally bound to relax 
domestic laws on abortion, non-law could potentially push state 
practice into a new norm of customary international law.36 
1. Inferring a Right to Abortion from the Right to Life 
In 1948 the U.N. General Assembly unanimously voted to 
adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).37 
Although the UDHR is not binding per se, it provides the foundation 
for numerous international human rights treaties.38 In addition, some 
                                                 
 33 See supra note 13. 
 34 See Cyra Akila Choudhury, Exporting Subjects: Globalizing Family Law 
Progress Through International Human Rights, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 259, 283-84 (2011) 
(“[I]t is safe to say that there really is no single international treaty or convention 
that is accepted universally and protects women’s right to reproductive choice, let 
alone abortion specifically. However, proponents of the recognition of such a right 
cobble together the provisions of the UDHR, CEDAW, ICCPR, and ICESCR to 
arrive at a rough approximation of legal support for the right.”). 
 35 See supra note 7. 
 36 See generally Zorzi, supra note 15 (describing the link between U.N. treaty 
monitoring bodies’ pro-abortion rights interpretations and national liberalization of 
abortion laws). 
 37 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; see also 
MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS xv (2001). 
 38 LORI F. DAMROSCH AND SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 936 (6th ed. 2014) (“The Declaration is not a treaty; it was 
not adopted as a treaty and was never submitted by states to their respective 
ratification processes.”). After the General Assembly adopted the UDHR, 
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parts of the UDHR, such as its prohibitions against state-sanctioned 
slavery and torture,39 are regarded as reflective of customary 
international law.40 Together, the UDHR, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights41 form the “International Bill 
of Human Rights.”42 
Article 3 of the UDHR states, “Everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and security of person.”43 The right to life is established as 
international law through the ICCPR44 and the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC).45 A mother’s right to life is the most 
compelling argument in support of an inferred right to abortion, as 
any other right of the mother (such as the right to health, the right to 
privacy, or the right to be free from discrimination) should be 
understood as inferior to the unborn child’s competing right to life.46 
However, as argued below, there are significant weaknesses in the 
link between a mother’s right to life and a right to abortion. 
                                                 
“consensus emerged among states to convert its norms into an international human 
rights covenant that would have the binding force of law.” Id. at 937. 
 39 UDHR, supra note 37, arts. 4-5. 
 40 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES §§ 702(b), (d) (Am. Law Inst. 1987). 
 
 41 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 11, 
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 42 HANNUM, supra note 27, at 137. 
 43 UDHR, supra note 37, art. 3. 
 44 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Dec. 19, 1966, S. 
Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, at 23 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 45 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter CRC]. 
 46 See Human Rights Committee, General Comment 6, art.6, ¶ 1 (16th 
session, 1982), http://www.refworld.org/ 
docid/45388400a.html (“The right to life enunciated in article 6 of the Covenant 
. . . is the supreme right from which no derogation is permitted even in time of 
public emergency which threatens the life of the nation. . . .”). 
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a. The Right to Life Under the ICCPR 
Under Article 6(1) of the ICCPR, “Every human being has 
the inherent right to life.”47Article 6(1) further provides that the right 
to life “shall be protected by law [and] [n]o one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his life.”48 In an effort to draw a link between a right to 
abortion and the right to life, pro-choice advocates and U.N. treaty 
monitoring bodies, offices, and agencies,49 often cite statistics 
regarding maternal death resulting from unsafe abortions.50 For 
example, a 2012 World Health Organization publication that refers to 
abortion as a human right states that each year, “[a]pproximately 
47[,]000 pregnancy-related deaths are due to complications of unsafe 
abortion.”51 While this arresting statistic does establish the potential 
danger abortion poses to a mother’s life and health, it does not in 
itself support a nexus between a mother’s right to life and a right to 
abortion. The fact that a practice is dangerous does not justify 
categorizing it as a right. Indeed, many acts are proscribed by law 
because they are dangerous. Furthermore, given that abortion raises 
issues of a prenatal human being’s right to life, those who advocate 
for a right to abortion based on a mother’s right to life would do well 
to offset the prenatal person’s competing rights by providing 
statistics that directly link the risk of carrying a child to term with the 
mother’s right to life.52 
                                                 
 47 ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 6(1). 
 48 Id. 
 49 See supra note 13. 
 50 For example, Christina Zampas and Jaime Gher, both attorneys with the 
pro-choice Center for Reproductive Rights when they co-wrote Abortion as a 
Right, begin their article by stating, “Every year, at least 70,000 women die from 
complications related to unsafe abortions.” Zampas & Gher, supra note 7, at 250. 
 51 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, SAFE ABORTION: TECHNICAL AND 
POLICY GUIDANCE FOR HEALTH SYSTEMS 17 (2d ed. 2012), 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/70914/1/9789241548434_eng.pdf 
[hereinafter Safe Abortion]. 
 52 A 2012 study that was based on data collected between 1998 and 2005 
stated that the mortality rate associated with childbirth was higher than the 
mortality rate associated with legal abortion. However, as the authors 
acknowledged, the study was subject to potentially significant weaknesses, such as 
an incomplete assessment of the underlying risks of abortion and childbirth, as well 
as possible erroneous analytic rules used in conducting the research. See Elizabeth 
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The experience and testimony of Dr. Anthony Levatino, an 
American obstetrician-gynecologist with over twenty years of 
experience, highlights the need to more closely examine the asserted 
link between abortion and a mother’s right to life.53 Dr. Levatino 
performed over 1,200 abortions prior to developing a personal 
conviction against the procedure.54 In 2012, he testified before 
Congress that the typical high-risk obstetrics case involved a mother 
with “severe pre-eclampsia or toxemia.”55 Pre-eclampsia involves a 
dangerous spike in blood pressure that can result in a major stroke 
and therefore threaten the mother’s life.56 The only cure for pre-
eclampsia is delivery of the baby.57 It is “one of the more common 
pregnancy complications, affecting about 5 to 8 percent of all 
pregnancies in the United States” and usually occurs in the third 
trimester of pregnancy.58 In his Congressional testimony, Dr. 
Levatino stated that “[i]n most such cases, any attempt to perform an 
abortion ‘to save the mother’s life’ would entail undue and dangerous 
                                                 
G. Raymond and David A. Grimes, The Comparative Safety of Legal Induced Abortion 
and Childbirth in the United States, 119 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 215, 215-19 
(2012). But see David Reardon, Comment to The Comparative Safety of Legal Induced 
Abortion and Childbirth in the United States, PUBMED.GOV (Mar. 5, 2014, 4:17 PM), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/myncbi/david.reardon.1/comments/ (noting the 
unreliability of Raymond and Grimes’ “simple comparison of reported mortality 
rates” and failure to provide record linkage. Reardon also points out that Raymond 
and Grimes neglected to discuss significant research that reached contrary 
conclusions regarding the relative safety of childbirth and legal abortion.). 
 53 Dr. Anthony Levatino, M.D., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 
http://health.usnews.com/doctors/anthony-levatino-394395 (last visited July 5, 
2017). 
 54 Bradford Richardson, Video of Former Abortionist Describing Late-Pregnancy 
Abortion Goes Viral, WASH. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2016), http://www.washington 
times.com/news/2016/mar/8/video-former-abortionist-describing-late-
pregnancy/. 
 55 Sarah Terzo, Former Abortionist: Abortion Is Never Medically Necessary to Save 
the Life of the Mother, LIVE ACTION (Oct. 21, 2016, 10:53 AM), 
https://www.liveaction.org/news/former-abortionist-abortion-is-never-medically-
necessary-to-save-the-life-of-the-mother/. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Shivani Patel, M.D., Preeclampsia Can Strike Suddenly During Pregnancy, UT 
SOUTHWESTERN NEWS (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www.utswmedicine.org/stories 
/articles/year-2015/preeclampsia.html. 
 58 Id. 
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delay in providing appropriate, truly life-saving care.”59 Accordingly, 
in hundreds of pre-eclampsia cases Dr. Levatino saved the mother’s 
life by “terminating” her pregnancy by delivering her baby via 
Cesarean section.60 Dr. Levatino testified, “In all those cases, the 
number of unborn children that I had to deliberately kill was zero.”61 
Over one thousand medical doctors, midwives, nurses, 
medical professors, and medical students agree with Dr. Levatino, 
stating, “As experienced practitioners and researchers in obstetrics 
and gynaecology, we affirm that direct abortion – the purposeful 
destruction of the unborn child – is not medically necessary to save 
the life of a woman.”62 This panel of medical professionals attests to 
the “fundamental difference between abortion, and necessary medical 
treatments that are carried out to save the life of the mother, even if 
such treatment results in the loss of life of her unborn child.”63 An 
example of this rare situation is when uterine cancer requires a 
hysterectomy to save the mother’s life.64 In such a case, the death of 
the child is foreseen, but is not a deliberate act itself; it is an 
unfortunate consequence of the mother’s life-saving medical care.65 A 
fair discussion of abortion in the context of a mother’s right to life 
should incorporate medical considerations such as these. 
                                                 
 59 Terzo, supra note 55. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Daniel Wechter et al., A Second Opinion: Response to 100 Professors, 29 
ISSUES L. & MED. 147, 150 (2014). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Right to Life, Submission to The Human Rights Committee for the 
General Discussion in Preparation for General Comment on Article 6 (Right to 
Life) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶ 7, n.2, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/GC36-
Article6Righttolife.aspx, accessible under “Documentation,” “Written 
contributions for the half day of discussion” [hereinafter Right to Life HRC 
Submission]. 
 65 Id; see also Wechter et al., supra note 62, at 150 (“[S]eparating the mother 
and fetus before fetal viability in life-threatening circumstances is distinct from 
elective abortion, since the purpose of the parturition is to hopefully produce both 
a living mother and a living fetus, but at least a living mother. There is no intent to 
produce a dead fetus.”) 
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b. Ireland’s Inconsistent Interpretation of the ICCPR 
In September 2015, the U.N. Human Rights Committee, the 
treaty monitoring body that declared in 2016 and 2017 that Ireland’s 
abortion laws violated the ICCPR, published Draft General 
Comment No. 36, in which it asserted a pro-abortion rights 
interpretation of Article 6 (right to life) of the ICCPR.66 The draft 
comment states: 
Unlike the American Convention on Human Rights, 
the Covenant does not explicitly refer to the rights of 
unborn children, including to their right to life. In the 
absence of subsequent agreements regarding the 
inclusion of the rights of the unborn within article 6 
and in the absence of uniform State practice which 
establishes such subsequent agreements, the 
Committee cannot assume that article 6 imposes on 
State parties an obligation to recognize the right to 
life of unborn children.67 
The HRC stated that because the ICCPR does not explicitly 
refer to the rights of unborn children, such rights cannot be assumed. 
The Committee is selective in their use of this approach to treaty 
interpretation; for neither does the ICCPR speak of a “right to 
abortion,” and yet the Committee reads such a right into Article 6, 
stating: 
States parties whose laws generally prohibit voluntary 
terminations of pregnancy must, nonetheless, maintain 
legal exceptions for therapeutic abortions necessary for 
protecting the life of mothers, inter alia by not 
exposing them to serious health risks, and for 
                                                 
 66 U.N. Human Rights Committee, Draft General Comment No. 36: 
Article 6 (Right to Life), ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/R.36/Rev.2 (Sept. 2, 2015), 
available at http://www.achrweb.org/reports/india/The-Right-to-life.pdf 
[hereinafter Draft General Comment No. 36]. 
 67 Id. 
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situations in which carrying a pregnancy to term 
would cause the mother severe mental anguish. . . . 68 
The severe mental anguish that a woman suffers in a 
pregnancy that comes about through rape or incest cannot be denied. 
However, “severe mental anguish” is a subjective term that could be 
used to justify abortions in situations in which the domestic laws of a 
state party forbid it, such as when the pregnancy does not threaten 
the mother’s life. In addition, an honest discussion of the severe 
mental harm associated with carrying an unwanted baby to term must 
also consider the severe mental harm that mothers often experience 
after an abortion.69 For example, two studies from Finland, a nation 
with relatively liberal abortion laws, including abortion for socio-
economic reasons,70 found that women who aborted were nearly six 
times more likely to commit suicide than those who had given birth.71 
While Draft Comment 36 claims that states parties to the 
ICCPR “must” provide for abortions, its comments are not 
binding.72 Furthermore, the only authority the HRC cites for its 
interpretation of the right to life is a list of its own non-binding 
concluding observations, all of which advocate for a loosening of 
                                                 
 68 Id. ¶ 7 (emphasis added). 
 69 See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. 
 70 WORLD ABORTION POLICIES 2013, U.N., DEPT. OF ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL AFFAIRS POPULATION DIVISION (2013), http://www.un.org/en/ 
development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/WorldAbortionPolicies20
13/WorldAbortionPolicies2013_WallChart.pdf. 
 71 Americans United for Life, Letter to the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee re: Draft General Comment No. 36 (June 11, 2015), 
http://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/06-11-2015-UN-letter-
AUL.pdf [hereinafter AUFL UNHRC Letter] citing Mika Gissler et al., Suicides 
After Pregnancy in Finland, 1987-94, 313 BRIT. MED. J. 1431, 1432 (1996); Mika 
Gissler, et al., Injury Deaths, Suicides and Homicides Associated with Pregnancy, 
Finland 1987-2000, 15 EUROPEAN J. PUB. HEALTH 459, 460 (2005)). AUFL’s letter 
lists hundreds of studies regarding the harm that abortion causes the mother’s 
health, including harm to her mental health that culminates in suicide. 
 72 See Laurence R. Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations 
Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1840 (citing Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 351 (1997) 
(discussing the “expressly nonbinding nature of Committee’s decisions”)). 
2018 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 6:1 
86 
states parties’ domestic restrictions on abortion, and a non-binding 
World Health Organization publication that likewise unilaterally 
classifies abortion as a right.73 
c. The Right to Life Under the CRC 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), like the 
ICCPR, explicitly acknowledges the right to life. Under Article 6 of 
the CRC, “States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent 
right to life . . . [and] shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the 
survival and development of the child.”74 The Convention defines 
“child” as “every human being below the age of eighteen years unless 
under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.”75 
Like the HRC, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the 
treaty monitoring body for the CRC, has issued concluding 
observations that infer a mother’s right to abortion, in this case an 
adolescent mother, from her right to life.76 For example, in March 
2016 the Committee on the Rights of the Child published its 
Concluding Observations on the Combined Third and Fourth 
Periodic Reports of Ireland, in which the Committee called upon the 
country to “[d]ecriminalize abortion in all circumstances and review its 
legislation with a view to ensuring access by children to safe abortion and 
post-abortion care services. . . .”77 The CRC Committee is but one of 
                                                 
 73 See Draft General Comment No. 36, nn.11-18, 20. 
 74 CRC, supra note 45, art. 6. 
 75 Id., art. 1. 
 76 Pro-choice advocates have likewise asserted a right to abortion via 
Article 6 of the CRC. See, e.g., Zampas & Gher, supra note 7, at 259-60 (advocating 
for a “right to abortion” for adolescent mothers under the CRC and noting 
concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child). 
 77 Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations on the 
Combined Third and Fourth Period Reports of Ireland, CRC/C/IRL/CO/3-4, 1 
Mar. 2016, ¶ 58(a), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybody external 
/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC/C/IRL/CO/3-4&Lang=En [hereinafter CRC 
2016 Concluding Observations on Ireland] (emphasis added). 
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five U.N. treaty monitoring bodies that has pressured Ireland to 
change its constitutional law regarding abortion.78 
The inference of a mother’s right to abortion is in direct 
conflict with strong textual arguments against a right to abortion 
under the CRC and in favor of the CRC’s protection of the unborn 
person’s right to life. First, neither the text nor the travaux 
préparatoires (“travaux”) of the CRC refer to a right to abortion.79 
According to human rights scholars, and contrary to the views of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, the drafters of the CRC 
intentionally did not take a position on abortion, recognizing that the 
states parties’ domestic legislation on the matter would vary.80 As 
Professor David Stewart stated, “[a] credible effort was made during 
the drafting process to ensure that the Convention is ‘abortion 
neutral.’“81 Second, in spite of indications of abortion neutrality in the 
travaux, the preamble explicitly indicates that the Convention’s 
protections extend to the unborn, stating, “the child, by reason of his 
physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, 
including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth.”82 
                                                 
 78 Fiona De Londras, Fatal Foetal Abnormality, Irish Constitutional Law, and 
Mellet v Ireland, 24 MED L. REV. 591 (2016) (referencing concluding observations 
and comments by the HRC; Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; 
CEDAW Committee; Committee on the Rights of the Child, and the Committee 
Against Torture). 
 79 Thomas Finegan, Article: International Human Rights Law and the “Unborn”: 
Texts and Travaux Preparatories, 25 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89, 121 (2016) 
(“Furthermore, neither the text nor the travaux gives any indication that the 
UNCRC contains a right to abortion.). 
 80 See Rutkow & Lozman, supra note 31, at 186 (“The CRC does not take a 
position on family planning or abortion issues. Most observers assume that the 
CRC’s authors deliberately left the CRC’s provisions on family planning open to 
interpretation by each of the ratifying States Parties.”). 
 81 Stewart, supra note 31, at 178. 
 82 CRC, supra note 45, pmbl; see infra Section IV.A.1.c regarding the right to 
life for the unborn under the CRC; see also Abby F. Janoff, Note: Rights of the Pregnant 
Child Vs. Rights of the Unborn Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 22 B.U. 
INT’L L.J. 163, 165 (2004) (stating that “[t]he Convention’s textual ambiguity calls 
into question the legality of abortion under the Convention. . . .”). The author 
nonetheless argues that, based on the non-binding views of the Committee and 
decisions of regional human rights bodies, which are not binding on non-parties to 
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2. Inferring a Right to Abortion from the Right to Health 
U.N. treaty committees and various U.N. agencies and offices 
have also sought to infer a right to abortion from the right to health, 
which states parties to five U.N. human rights treaties have agreed to 
ensure their citizens.83 In support of the inference of a right to 
abortion from the mother’s right to health, pro-choice advocates and 
the U.N. often refer to the Programme of Action that was adopted at 
the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development 
(ICPD) in Cairo.84 The Programme of Action is not binding; even if 
it were, it does not provide convincing support for inferring a right to 
abortion from the right to health.85 On the contrary, it contains 
strong language against abortion: 
                                                 
the regional human rights treaties, “under the Convention, the rights of a pregnant 
child trump the rights of a fetus.” Id. at 164, 176. The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties does consider “subsequent practice” to be a valid consideration for 
treaty interpretation. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(b), May 
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. However, the “subsequent 
practice” to which the VCLT refers is not the subsequent practice of U.N. treaty 
committees or regional human rights judiciaries, but rather that of the states parties 
to the particular U.N. treaties at issue. The VCLT states that, in interpreting 
treaties, “[t]here shall be taken into account, together with the context . . . any 
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement 
of the parties regarding its interpretation.” Id. 
 83 The right to health is recognized under the CRC, ICESCR, the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (Disabilities 
Convention), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination. See Stephen P. Marks, Normative Expansion of the Right to Health and 
the Proliferation of Human Rights, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 97, n.14 (2016). 
 84 Zampas & Gher, supra note 7, at 268 (citing Report of the International 
Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, 5-13 Sept. 1994, 
A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1 (1995), Chapter VIII C. Women′s Health and Safe 
Motherhood, ¶ 8.25). 
 85 See Ligia M. De Jesus, Treaty Interpretation of the Right to Life Before Birth by 
Latin American and Caribbean States: An Analysis of Common International Treaty 
Obligations and Relevant State Practice at International Fora, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
599, 619-20 (2012) (“Contrary to common misconceptions, CEDAW . . . and other 
international, non-binding instruments, such as the Cairo and Beijing international 
conferences, do not create abortion rights.”). 
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In no case should abortion be promoted as a method of family 
planning. All Governments and relevant 
intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations are urged to strengthen their 
commitment to women’s health, to deal with the 
health impact of unsafe abortion as a major public 
health concern and to reduce the recourse to abortion 
through expanded and improved family-planning 
services. Prevention of unwanted pregnancies must always 
be given the highest priority and every attempt should be 
made to eliminate the need for abortion. Women who have 
unwanted pregnancies should have ready access to 
reliable information and compassionate counselling. Any 
measures or changes related to abortion within the 
health system can only be determined at the national or local 
level according to the national legislative process. In 
circumstances where abortion is not against the law, 
such abortion should be safe. In all cases, women 
should have access to quality services for the 
management of complications arising from abortion. 
Post-abortion counselling, education and family-
planning services should be offered promptly, which 
will also help to avoid repeat abortions.86 
As Harvard professor Mary Ann Glendon said, “One would 
hardly say of an important right like free speech, for example, that 
governments should reduce it, eliminate the need for it, and help 
avoid its repetition.”87 Not only did the Cairo conference delegates 
                                                 
 86 Rep. of the Int’l Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, 5-
13 Sept. 1994, A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1 (1995), 244 ¶ 63(i), 
http://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/programme_of_action_Web 
%20ENGLISH.pdf (emphasis added) [hereinafter Cairo Conference]. It should be 
noted that the statement “Prevention of unwanted pregnancies must always be 
given the highest priority and every attempt should be made to eliminate the need 
for abortion” refers to contraception, meaning the prevention of pregnancy 
through conception, as opposed to the termination of a conceived human being 
through abortion. 
 87 Mary Ann Glendon, What Happened at Beijing, FIRST THINGS (Jan. 1996), 
https://www.firstthings.com/article/1996/01/005-what-happened-at-beijing 
[hereinafter Glendon, What Happened at Beijing]; see also De Jesus, supra note 85, at 
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not agree to a right to abortion, some countries explicitly stated their 
opposition to such a right in reservations they added to the 
conference outcome document.88 
In 2015, the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) launched the Information Series on Sexual 
and Reproductive Health and Rights, in which the Office sought to 
infer a right to abortion from the right to health.89 The section on 
abortion states, “Ensuring access to [abortion] in accordance with 
human rights standards is part of State obligations to . . . ensure 
women’s right to health as well as other fundamental human 
rights.”90 In support of this proposition, the OHCHR references 
non-binding treaty committee communications and the Cairo ICPD 
Programme of Action, in spite of its clear language against abortion.91 
Like the OHCHR, the Committee on the Rights of the Child 
has asserted a right to abortion through the right to health. Under 
                                                 
620 (“Even though the outcome documents for the international conferences of 
Cairo and Beijing, . . . (the nature of which is entirely non-binding), are often cited 
as authorities supporting the creation of international abortion rights, neither 
document comes close to doing so”). 
 88 See William L. Saunders, Neither by Treaty, Nor by Custom: Through the Doha 
Declaration, the World Rejects Claimed International Rights to Abortion and Same-Sex 
Marriage, Affirming Traditional Understandings of Human Rights, 9 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 67, 88-89 (2011). 
 89 OHCHR, LAUNCH OF THE INFORMATION SERIES ON SEXUAL AND 
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND RIGHTS (2015), http://www.ohchr.org/ 
Documents/Issues/Women/WRGS/SexualHealth/Flyer%20Launch%20Event%2
0 Information%20Series%20SRHR%20final.pdf (emphasis added). 
 90 OHCHR, INFORMATION SERIES ON SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE 
HEALTH AND RIGHTS: ABORTION, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues 
/Women/WRGS/SexualHealth/INFO_Abortion_ 
WEB.pdf. 
 91 Id. The OHCHR also cited the non-binding Beijing Platform for Action, 
which was adopted at the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, stating “in 
circumstances where abortion is not against the law, health systems should train 
and equip health-service providers and should take other measures to ensure that 
such abortion is safe and accessible. Additional measures should be taken to 
safeguard women’s health.” Id. at 1. As with the Cairo Programme of Action, this 
statement does not establish a right to abortion as inferred by a woman’s right to 
health. On the contrary, it indicates that abortion is illegal in some nations and may 
threaten a woman’s health. 
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Article 24 of the CRC, “States Parties recognize the right of the child 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health and to 
facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health [and] 
. . . shall strive to ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right 
of access to such health care services.”92 However, as discussed in 
infra Section IV.A.1.c, interpreting Article 24 to include a right to 
abortion conflicts with the CRC preamble’s explicit reference to the 
vulnerability of unborn children in describing the rationale for the 
CRC’s protections. 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child did not mention 
the CRC’s reference to protection for unborn children in its 2016 
concluding observations on Ireland, in which it criticized Ireland’s 
domestic abortion law which allows for abortion only when 
pregnancy poses a “real and substantial risk” to the mother’s life.93 In 
spite of Ireland’s sovereign decision to balance the rights of the 
unborn child against the rights of the mother, the Committee 
recommended that Ireland “[d]ecriminalize abortion in all 
circumstances and review its legislation with a view to ensuring access by 
children to safe abortion. . . .”94 By stating that Ireland’s CRC obligations 
required that the government “ensure access” to abortions, the 
Committee effectively read a right to abortion into the CRC’s right to 
health. In order to fulfill this right, Ireland would need to ensure 
sufficient abortion providers and facilities—measures that Ireland, 
whose Constitution explicitly protects unborn life, certainly did not 
anticipate when it ratified the CRC.95 Moreover, requiring medical 
practitioners to provide abortion services could violate their explicit 
right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion under Article 
18 of the ICCPR, to which Ireland is a party, as well as freedom of 
opinion and expression under Article 19 of the ICCPR. 
                                                 
 92 CRC, supra note 45, art. 24(1). 
 93 CRC 2016 Concluding Observations on Ireland, supra note 77, ¶ 57. 
 94 Id. ¶ 58(a) (emphasis added). 
 95 See infra text corresponding to notes 101-10 (quoting the treaty 
monitoring bodies for the CEDAW and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural rights as requiring states to subordinate the conscientious 
objection of medical providers to those seeking to exercise an inferred right to 
abortion). 
2018 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 6:1 
92 
In addition to the OHCHR and the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, the treaty monitoring body for the U.N. Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW),96 has also asserted a right to abortion from the right to 
health. Article 12 of CEDAW states: 
1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to 
eliminate discrimination against women in the field of 
health care in order to ensure, on a basis of equality 
of men and women, access to health care services, 
including those related to family planning. 
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph I of 
this article, States Parties shall ensure to women 
appropriate services in connection with pregnancy, 
confinement and the post-natal period, granting free 
services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition 
during pregnancy and lactation.97 
Although Article 12 of the CEDAW contains no reference to 
abortion, and the travaux of CEDAW demonstrate that the drafters 
did not consider “family planning” or other CEDAW terminology to 
create a right to abortion, “[t]he CEDAW Committee regularly 
appeals to Article 12(1) of CEDAW to support abortion rights.”98 In 
fact, among the U.N. treaty monitoring bodies, the CEDAW 
Committee “is perhaps the most insistent on a human right to 
abortion,”99 having criticized over one hundred states parties’ 
domestic restrictions on abortion on the basis of non-binding U.N. 
publications.100 For example, in 2014 the CEDAW Committee, in 
                                                 
 96 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, art. 11.1(f), Dec. 21, 1965, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; 19 
I.L.M. 33 [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
 97 Id. art. 12(1), (2). 
 98 Finegan, supra note 79, at 124-25. 
 99 Id. at 124; see also Joanne Pedone & Andrew R. Kloster, New Proposals for 
Human Rights Treaty Body Reform, 22 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 29, 50-52 (2012-
2013) (“The clearest example of [the CEDAW Committee’s] overstepping can be 
seen in the context of abortion.”). 
 100 See Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 52 (stating that the CEDAW 
Committee has “criticized well over eighty nations for having restrictions on 
abortion, based on the authority of its very own General Recommendation 
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connection with a woman’s right to health, recommended that Peru 
“[e]nsure the availability of abortion services” and “[e]nsure that the 
exercise of conscientious objection by health professionals does not 
impede effective access by women to reproductive health-care 
services, including abortion.”101 Considering that the ICCPR, to which 
Peru is a party,102 explicitly guarantees the right to freedom of 
conscience, and neither the text of the CEDAW nor its travaux 
provide for a right to abortion, the CEDAW Committee’s 
interpretation raises significant concerns that the Committee has 
overstepped its treaty mandate.103 
In line with pro-abortion rights efforts by the OHCHR, the 
CRC Committee, and the CEDAW Committee, the Committee on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), which oversees state 
party compliance with the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), published in 2016 General 
Comment No. 22, which sought to interpret the ICESCR’s right to 
sexual and reproductive health to include a right to abortion.104 Like 
the CEDAW Committee, the CESCR even went so far as to assert 
that states parties were required to ensure that the “[u]navailability of 
goods and services due to ideologically based policies or practices, 
such as the refusal to provide services based on conscience, . . . not 
be a barrier to accessing [abortion] services.”105 The CESCR would 
specifically require states to supply “[a]n adequate number of health-
                                                 
Number 24.”). A more recent publication accounts for subsequent instances of the 
Committee’s admonishments. See De Jesus, supra note 85, at 623. 
 101 CEDAW, Concluding observations on the combined seventh and 
eighth periodic reps. of Peru, P 36(d), U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/PER/CO/7-8 (July 
24, 2014) ¶¶ 36(b), (d), http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal 
/Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW/C/PER/CO/7-8&Lang=En (emphasis 
added). 
 102 See Status of Ratification, Peru, OHCHR, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ 
ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2018). 
 103 See infra Section III.B; see also Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 49-54. 
 104 Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 
General Comment No. 22 on the Right to Sexual and Reproductive health (Art. 12 
of the ICESCR), P 28, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/22 (Mar. 4, 2016), 
https://www.escr-net.org/resources/general-comment-no-22-2016-right-sexual-
and-reproductive-health [hereinafter CESCR General Comment No. 22]. 
 105 Id. ¶ 14. 
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care providers willing and able to provide [abortion] . . . in both 
public and private facilities.”106 In addition to public and private 
healthcare practitioners and facilities, the Committee also stated that 
the inferred right to abortion required states to prohibit conscientious 
objections of private health insurance companies.107 According to the 
CESCR, state parties’ duty to fulfill the “right to abortion” would 
also require the “adopt[ion] [of] appropriate legislative, 
administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other 
measures. . . .”108 Perhaps most troubling of all is the Committee’s 
suggestion that states must “take affirmative measures to eradicate 
social barriers in terms of norms or beliefs that inhibit individuals of 
different ages and genders, women, girls and adolescents from 
autonomously exercising their right to sexual and reproductive 
health,”109 which the Committee interprets to include a right to 
abortion.110 If the CESCR’s standard were to be strictly enforced, 
religious organizations, and even individuals, would presumably be 
prohibited from communicating their belief that abortion is the 
termination of a human being, in spite of treaty-affirmed rights to 
freedom of opinion and expression. 
To support its pro-abortion rights interpretation of the right 
to sexual and reproductive health, the CESCR does not cite a treaty, 
or even a U.N. consensus document, but rather a resolution adopted 
by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe—hardly a 
fair representation of the global views regarding abortion, and 
certainly not binding on many ICESCR states.111 Moreover, the 
                                                 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. ¶ 60. 
 108 Id. ¶ 45. 
 109 Id. ¶ 48 
 110 Id. ¶¶ 28, 34 (“A wide range of laws, policies and practices undermine 
the autonomy and right to equality and non-discrimination in the full enjoyment of 
the right to sexual and reproductive health, for example criminalization of abortion 
or restrictive abortion laws.”) (emphasis added). 
 111 Id. at n.21. 
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CESCR is not authorized to judge state party compliance on the basis 
of anything but the ICESCR’s requirements.112 
The CEDAW Committee has likewise cited non-binding 
European standards in support of its effort to create a right to 
abortion. For example, in 2000 the Committee criticized 
Luxembourg’s abortion laws, which the Committee considered 
“anachronistic.” 113 The CEDAW Committee further stated “that the 
Government appear[ed] to lack the commitment to review and adapt 
this legislation to changing attitudes and developments in the 
European region.”114 At the time, Luxembourg allowed for abortion 
when a physician determined the procedure was necessary to 
preserve a woman’s life or health, as well as in cases where the 
pregnancy was the result of rape or incest.115 Luxembourg also 
permitted abortion on the basis of fetal impairment, and even social 
or economic considerations.116 Evidently the CEDAW Committee 
was not satisfied, as Luxembourg’s domestic laws did not allow 
abortion on demand.117 
Nowhere in the CEDAW treaty mandate is the Committee 
authorized to pressure a state to accommodate the “changing 
attitudes and developments” within a region, particularly on the basis 
of a right that does not expressly appear in international law. 
Furthermore, the Committee’s censure arguably violated the U.N. 
Charter’s prohibition against intervention in matters exclusively 
within national jurisdiction, such as abortion.118 Nonetheless, in 2012 
Luxembourg changed its laws on abortion at least in part because of 
                                                 
 112 Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99 at 42 (quoting a former HRC member 
as stating that this practice “rais[es], at a minimum, issues of mandate and 
competency”). 
 113 Rep. of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women: Concluding Comments by the Committee: Germany, U.N. Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, 22nd Sess., P 318, U.N. Doc. 
A/55/38 (2000) ¶ 406, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reports 
/a5538.pdf. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Zorzi, supra note 15, at 409. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
2018 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 6:1 
96 
the pressure from the CEDAW Committee to conform to European 
norms.119 
Like the OHCHR, the World Health Organization (WHO), a 
specialized U.N. agency,120 has contributed to the U.N. treaty 
monitoring bodies’ “[c]onsiderable normative expansion . . . [of] 
reproductive health and rights.”121 In 2012, the WHO published the 
second edition of Safe Abortion: Technical and Policy Guidance for Health 
Systems.122 The publication asserts that “[t]he fulfilment of human 
rights requires that women can access safe abortion when it is 
indicated to protect their health.”123 In support of this proposition, 
the WHO cites an extensive list of non-binding treaty committee 
general comments and concluding observations, as well as the 
Maputo Protocol, which applies only to the specific African nations 
that have ratified that treaty.124 
In spite of the absence of a right to abortion in international 
law, the WHO, like the CESCR and the CEDAW Committee, goes 
so far as to suggest that the inferred right trumps explicitly 
guaranteed rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, 
and even requires states to force unwilling healthcare providers to 
perform abortions, stating: 
While the right to freedom of thought, conscience, 
and religion is protected by international human 
rights law, international human rights law also 
stipulates that freedom to manifest one’s religion or 
beliefs might be subject to limitations necessary to 
protect the fundamental human rights of others. 
                                                 
 119 Zorzi, supra note 15, at 410. 
 120 Funds, Programmes, Specialized Agencies and Others, UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/funds-programmes-specialized-
agencies-and-others/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2018). 
 121 Marks, supra note 83, at 110. 
 122 See generally Safe Abortion, supra note 51. 
 123 Id. at 92; see also id. at 64 (“Abortion laws and services should protect 
the health and human rights of all women, including adolescents. . . . Emergency 
treatment of abortion complications . . . cannot replace the protection of women’s 
health and their human rights afforded by safe, legal induced abortion.”). 
 124 Id. at 99, n.9. 
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Therefore laws and regulations should not entitle 
providers and institutions to impede women’s access 
to lawful health services. Health-care professionals 
who claim conscientious objection must refer the 
woman to another willing and trained provider in the 
same, or another easily accessible health-care facility, 
in accordance with national law. Where referral is not 
possible, the health-care professional who objects must provide 
abortion to save the woman’s life or to prevent damage to her 
health.125 
Exactly how a state might force an objecting healthcare 
professional to provide an abortion is unclear.126 The WHO provides 
no practical suggestions. 
Despite efforts by NGOs and U.N. treaty monitoring bodies, 
agencies, and offices to establish a right to abortion through the right 
to health, in 2011 Thoraya Obaid, upon completing ten years as 
executive director of the U.N. Population Fund, stated, “We, 
UNFPA, are mandated to consider abortion within the context of 
public health, but never as a right, as some NGOs do. . . . Abortion is 
a national issue to be decided by national laws and legislations.”127 
She could have added “and U.N. treaty monitoring bodies, agencies, 
and offices” after “NGOs.” 
3. Inferring a Right to Abortion from Other Rights 
In addition to the right to life and the right to health, U.N. 
treaty committees have sought to infer a right to abortion from the 
right to be free from torture and from cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, the right to privacy, the right to equality before the law, 
                                                 
 125 Id. at 96 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 126 The WHO’s troubling suggestion is not entirely unprecedented. In 2015 
Sweden attempted to force a Christian midwife to perform abortions. See Swedish 
Anti-Abortion Midwife Loses Court Case, BBC NEWS (Apr. 13, 2017), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39587154. 
 127 Katherine Marshall, Navigating the Turbulent Waters of Religion and Women’s 
Rights: An Interview with Thoraya Obaid, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2011), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/katherine-marshall/courageous-in-navigating-
_b_806313.html. 
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and the equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil 
and political rights.128 
a. The Right to Freedom from Torture and CIDTP 
The ICCPR and the Convention Against Torture (CAT) 
obligate states parties to protect their citizens from torture and 
“cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” (CIDTP).129 
While neither the ICCPR nor the CAT mention abortion, the HRC 
and the Committee Against Torture, the treaty monitoring body for 
the CAT, have asserted that numerous states parties have violated 
their obligation to prevent CIDTP because of domestic restrictions 
against abortion.130 The HRC’s 2016 decision in Mellet v. Ireland131 and 
                                                 
 128 See, e.g., Views of the Human Rights Comm., Commc’n No. 1608/2007, 
L.M.R. v. Argentina, P 8.5, 9.4, 10 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007 (Apr. 
28, 2011) (finding that Argentina had violated Article 2 of the ICCPR (failure to 
provide judicial remedy) in connection with Article 3 of the ICCPR (the “equal 
right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights”) on 
account of the fact that only women could potentially have abortions and therefore 
Argentina’s prohibition against the procedure amounted to discriminatory 
treatment against the author of the communication). The WHO would expand 
upon this list of human rights bases for an inferred right to abortion, stating that, in 
addition to the aforementioned rights, states that do not “provide comprehensive 
sexual and reproductive health information and services to women and adolescents, 
eliminate regulatory and administrative barriers that impede women’s access to safe abortion 
services and provide treatment for abortion complications . . . may not meet their 
treaty and constitutional obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the right to . . . 
confidentiality, information and education.” Safe Abortion, supra note 51, at 88 
(emphasis added). 
 129 ICCRP, supra note 44, art. 7; Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment arts. 2(1), 16(1) Dec. 10, 
1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. 
 130 See Alyson Zureick, (En)Gendering Suffering: Denial of Abortion as a Form of 
Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment, 38 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 99, 100-101, 125-131 
(2015), stating: International law has long considered the regulation of abortion to 
be a prerogative of the State. In recent years, however, international human rights 
bodies have begun to consider the conformity of domestic abortion regulations 
with States’ human rights obligations [and examining a] trend among human rights 
bodies: namely, their willingness to find that denying or obstructing a woman’s 
access to abortion can amount to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment (“CIDT”) 
under multiple human rights treaties. Id. at 100. 
 131 Mellet v. Ireland, supra note 1, ¶ 7.4. 
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its 2017 nearly identical decision in Whelan v. Ireland132 provide recent 
examples of this practice. 
Mellet v. Ireland involved a woman who desired to have an 
abortion when she discovered, in her twenty-first week of pregnancy, 
that her baby had a congenital heart defect that would result in the 
baby’s death “in utero or shortly after birth.”133 Given that Ireland’s 
laws did not permit abortion in Ms. Mellet’s situation, she traveled to 
England to terminate her baby’s life.134 Citing only its own non-
binding general comment, the HRC found that because Ireland 
permits abortion only when necessary to save the mother’s life, “the 
State party had subjected Ms. Mellet to conditions of intense physical 
and mental suffering.”135 The bases for the HRC’s finding were 
essentially the facts that Ms. Mellet had to travel to England to obtain 
the abortion; that she experienced “shame and stigma associated with 
the criminalization of abortion of a fatally ill foetus;” and that she had 
to cover her own expenses for the trip and procedure.136 In spite of 
Ireland’s explicit legal protection of unborn life, the HRC did not 
discuss how Ms. Mellet’s twenty-three-week-old fetus, who had a 
heartbeat and was capable of experiencing pain, may have suffered 
torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment on account of the 
feticide’s impact on the unborn baby’s body.137 
                                                 
 132 Whelan v. Ireland, supra note 5, ¶ 7.7. 
 133 Mellet v. Ireland, supra note 1, ¶ 2.1. 
 134 Id. ¶ 2.2. 
 135 Id. ¶ 7.4. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Mellet v. Ireland, supra note 1, ¶ 2.3. According to “[a] wealth of 
anatomical, behavioral and physiological evidence . . . the developing human fetus 
is capable of experiencing tremendous pain by 20 weeks post-fertilization.” 
Doctors on Fetal Pain, http://www.doctorsonfetalpain.com/fetal-pain-the-
evidence/ [hereinafter Doctors on Fetal Pain]. As medical doctors have explained, 
[p]ain receptors are present throughout the unborn child’s entire body by no later 
than 16 weeks after fertilization, and nerves link these receptors to the brain’s 
thalamus and subcortical plate by no later than 20 weeks. For unborn children, says 
Dr. Paul Ranalli, a neurologist at the University of Toronto, 20 weeks is a “uniquely 
vulnerable time, since the pain system is fully established, yet the higher level pain-
modifying system has barely begun to develop.” As a result, unborn babies at this 
age probably feel pain more intensely than adults. Id. Furthermore, [b]y 8 weeks 
after fertilization, the unborn child reacts to touch. By 20 weeks post-fertilization, 
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b. The Right to Privacy 
In Mellet v. Ireland, the HRC also found that Ireland had 
violated its obligation to not arbitrarily interfere with Ms. Mellet’s 
right to privacy.138 Article 17 of the ICCPR states, “No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his 
honour and reputation [and] [e]veryone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”139 The 
HRC “consider[ed] that the balance that Ireland has chosen to strike 
between protection of the foetus and the rights of the woman in this 
case [could not] be justified,” and by not providing Ms. Mellet with 
an abortion in Ireland, the state party caused an unreasonable and 
arbitrary violation of her Article 17 right to privacy.140 As with its pro-
abortion interpretation of the right to freedom from CIDTP, the 
HRC cited only its own non-binding publications to support its 
finding that “a woman’s decision to request termination of 
pregnancy” is inferred by her right to privacy.141 
c. The Right to Equality Before the Law (Non-Discrimination) 
Article 26’s prohibition against discrimination was the third 
basis upon which the HRC determined that Ireland had violated its 
ICCPR obligations in not providing Ms. Mellet with an abortion. 
Article 26 states: 
                                                 
the unborn child reacts to stimuli that would be recognized as painful if applied to 
an adult human—for example, by recoiling. Surgeons entering the womb to 
perform corrective procedures on unborn children have seen those babies flinch, 
jerk and recoil from sharp objects and incisions. In addition, ultrasound technology 
shows that unborn babies at 20 weeks and earlier react physically to outside stimuli 
such as sound, light and touch. Id. See also infra notes 258-63 and accompanying 
text. 
 138 Mellet v. Ireland, supra note 1, ¶ 7.8. 
 139 ICCRP, supra note 44, art. 17. 
 140 Mellet v. Ireland, supra note 1, ¶ 7.8. 
 141 Id. ¶ 7.7. The HRC came to the same conclusion in Whelan v. Ireland. 
See Whelan v. Ireland, supra note 5, ¶ 7.9 (citing the HRC’s non-binding decision in 
Mellet v. Ireland). 
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All persons are equal before the law and are entitled 
without any discrimination to the equal protection of 
the law . . . the law shall prohibit any discrimination 
and guarantee to all persons equal and effective 
protection against discrimination on any ground such 
as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.142 
With respect to discrimination based on gender, the HRC 
“note[d] the author’s claim that Ireland’s criminalization of abortion 
subjected her to a gender-based stereotype of the reproductive role of 
women primarily as mothers, and that stereotyping her as a 
reproductive instrument subjected her to discrimination.”143 The 
Committee did not further elaborate on, or provide its own analysis 
of, the connection between a right to abortion and gender 
discrimination. Certainly, carrying a child to term impacts the mother 
in ways that the father cannot experience physically, mentally, or 
socially. However, as the HRC itself stated, discrimination involves a 
“differentiation of treatment.” 144 In denying Ms. Mellet an abortion, 
Ireland did not treat Ms. Mellet differently than it treats male citizens 
by, for example, depriving her of a state job or medical coverage 
because of her pregnancy. Ireland does not permit the termination of 
human life in utero under any circumstances other than when the 
mother’s life is determined to be in jeopardy. Ireland is not 
responsible for the fact that only women are biologically capable of 
carrying a child, and it certainly did not discriminate against Ms. 
Mellet on the basis of her gender in denying her an abortion. 
The HRC also found that Ireland’s denial of an abortion in 
Ms. Mellet’s case constituted discrimination on the basis of socio-
economic circumstances. Specifically, Ireland’s public health system 
would have covered Ms. Mellet’s medical expenses if she had carried 
                                                 
 142 ICCRP, supra note 44, art. 26. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Mellet v. Ireland, supra note 1, ¶ 7.11 (“[N]ot every differentiation of 
treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are 
reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate 
under the Covenant.”). 
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her baby to term, but she had to pay out of pocket for the costs of 
traveling to and having an abortion in England.145 However, Ireland 
does not provide abortions to any person under Ms. Mellet’s 
circumstances. The fact that Ms. Mellet had to cover her own 
expenses to procure in another country a procedure that was illegal 
under her own nation’s laws did not establish differentiation of 
treatment. Accordingly, as with its gender discrimination analysis, the 
Committee did not satisfy its own “differentiation of treatment” 
criteria with respect to discrimination on the basis of socio-economic 
status. As HRC member Anja Seibert-Fohr stated in her partial 
dissent in the Mellet matter, as well as in the nearly identical 2017 
Whelan matter, “Difference in treatment requires comparable 
situations in order to give rise to discrimination.”146 
B. Customary International Law Does Not Establish a Right to 
Abortion 
In addition to treaties, “international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law,” forms the second of the two 
primary sources of international law.147 The Restatement provides the 
classic definition of customary international law (CIL), stating, 
“Customary international law results from a general and consistent 
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal 
obligation.”148 As discussed below, the “general and consistent 
practice of states” does not affirm abortion as a human right.149 
                                                 
 145 Id. ¶ 7.10. 
 146 Mellet v. Ireland, supra note 1, ¶ 4; Whelan v. Ireland, supra note 5, at 
22, ¶ 4. 
 147 ICJ Statute, supra note 20, art. 38(1)(b). 
 148 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES §102(2) (Am. Law Inst. 1987). 
 149 See Saunders, supra note 88, at 81 (“despite the frequent representations 
of pro-abortion . . . advocates [regarding a right to abortion], international law--
customary or otherwise--does not actually support their claims or objectives”); see 
also De Jesus, supra note 85, at 618 (“[N]o international norm of customary 
international law recognizes a human right to take the life of an unborn child 
through abortion or mandates the legalization of abortion.”). 
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When states ratify human rights treaties, they agree to give 
the rights contained therein effect in their national legislation. For 
example, Article 2 of the ICCPR provides: 
Where not already provided for by existing legislative 
or other measures, each State Party to the present 
Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in 
accordance with its constitutional processes and with 
the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such 
laws or other measures as may be necessary to give 
effect to the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant.150 
If states considered themselves bound by treaties or 
customary international law to provide access to abortion, their 
domestic laws would reflect that belief, and their courts would hold 
accountable those who restrict others from obtaining an abortion. A 
global survey of domestic legislation on abortion, however, reflects 
an inconsistency that unravels any claim to a right to abortion as a 
matter of CIL,151 other than a possible regional custom in Africa.152 
States’ laws range from absolute prohibitions against abortion under 
any circumstances to allowing abortion on demand (simply because 
the mother does not want the baby) up to a certain point of the 
pregnancy.153 In fact, as discussed in infra Section V.B, because of the 
                                                 
 150 ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 2(2). 
 151 Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, Abortion, Moral Law, and the First Amendment: 
The Conflict Between Fetal Rights & Freedom of Religion, 23 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN 
& L. 271, 306 (2017) (“The parameters for allowable abortion vary drastically from 
country to country.”); see also Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 50 (“International 
consensus on the topic has proven impossible because countries hold widely 
divergent views. Consequently, the negotiation of many international human rights 
treaties that could address abortion, even tangentially, has resulted in an agreement 
to reserve the issue for states to resolve individually.”); Eliza Mackintosh, Abortion 
Laws Around the World: From Bans to Personal Choice, CNN (Jan. 25, 2017), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/health/abortion-laws-around-the-world/ 
(“Abortion laws vary dramatically around the world -- in some countries it’s a 
personal choice, in others it’s flatly illegal, and in many countries abortions are only 
accepted in certain situations such as fetal impairment or in cases of rape.”). 
 152 See supra note 24 (discussing the Maputo Protocol). 
 153 Billauer, supra note 151, at 306-07. 
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lack of international consensus on abortion, “[i]n April 2015, for the 
first time in history, the United Nations Commission on Population 
and Development concluded without an outcome document.”154 
Aware of the fact that CIL does not presently recognize a 
right to abortion, it appears that U.N. treaty monitoring bodies, 
offices, and agencies anticipate that if they can assert a right to 
abortion with sufficient force and frequency, enough nations will 
change their domestic laws to comply with the asserted right, thereby 
proving sufficient state practice with opinio juris to constitute a new 
rule of customary international law: a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Similarly, the U.N. might expect that by pressuring enough states to 
liberalize their abortion laws they can establish abortion-friendly 
“subsequent practice” by which to reinterpret human rights treaties 
under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and 
therefore build a strong case against resistant nations.155 
III. TREATY INTERPRETATION AND THE SURREPTITIOUS EFFORT TO 
CRAFT A RIGHT TO ABORTION 
In partnership with pro-choice NGOs, U.N. treaty 
monitoring bodies, offices, and agencies have sought to push a right 
to abortion through international law’s back door with right-by-
inference treaty interpretations that could, if enough states respond 
by changing their domestic abortion laws, lead to a new rule of 
customary international law. However, as Professor Mary Ann 
Glendon has said, “it is a basic principle of interpretation that 
fundamental rights cannot be created or destroyed by implication.”156 
A. Treaty Interpretation 
The VCLT157 is considered “far and away the most legally 
authoritative guide to the accurate interpretation of . . . international 
                                                 
 154 Johanna Kalb, Human Rights Proxy Wars, 13 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 53, 76 
(2017). 
 155 See VCLT, supra note 82, art. 31(3)(b). 
 156 Glendon, What Happened at Beijing, supra note 87. 
 157 VCLT, supra note 82. 
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legal treaties.”158 As of June 2017, 114 states have ratified the 
VCLT.159 Under Article 31 of the VCLT, states parties agree that 
treaties “shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.”160 Article 31 
further provides that treaty terms can have special meanings, if it is 
determined that such was the intention of the parties.161 Where the 
meaning of a treaty term remains uncertain, clarification may be 
sought from the travaux préparatoires.162 
The term “abortion” does not appear in any U.N. human 
rights treaty, and states have agreed that abortion is not included 
within the term “family planning.”163 As such, one would expect 
treaty monitoring bodies to justify their interpretations in accordance 
with accepted treaty interpretation methodology. However, “the 
manifold ‘concluding observations’ concerning abortion simply assert 
that the Articles in question contain a right to abortion,”164 despite 
the fact that the travaux to several of the treaties reveal that the states 
parties specifically agreed to leave the matter of abortion up to each 
state.165 
                                                 
 158 Finegan, supra note 79, at 91. 
 159 Status of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. TREATY 
COLLECTIONS, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ View DetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY 
&mtdsg_no=XXIII-1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en (last visited Feb. 
23, 2018). 
 160 VCLT, supra note 82, art. 31(1). Article 31 of the VCLT is considered a 
reflection of customary international law. Finegan, supra note 79, at n.11. 
 161 VCLT, supra note 82, art. 31(4). 
 162 Id. art. 32. 
 163 Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 44; s ee also id. at 51, stating, 
Article 12 [of the CEDAW] contains the phrase “family planning,” and two [U.N.] 
conferences in 1994 and 1995 expressly confirmed that states did not understand 
“family planning” to include abortion rights. Nonetheless, just four years later in 
1999, the CEDAW Committee issued General Recommendation 24, asserting 
“family planning” includes a right to abortion. It cited to no authority for this 
proposition. 
 164 Finegan, supra note 79, at 122. 
 165 See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text regarding the CRC 
travaux. See Finegan, supra note 79, at n.151 regarding CEDAW travaux. 
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B. The Limits of Treaty Monitoring Body Authority 
The core U.N. human rights treaties provide for the creation 
of a body of between ten and twenty-three independent experts 
charged with monitoring state party compliance.166 The treaty 
monitoring body mandates authorize these experts to: 
1. Monitor the periodic reports of States Parties; 
2. Honor States Parties’ requests to send a delegation 
during the consideration of their State Party’s periodic 
report; 
3. Issue summaries of States Parties’ compliance in 
treaty body annual reports; and 
4. Issue collective, non-binding, and non-critical 
comments, suggestions, and recommendations on 
States Parties’ periodic reports.167 
Treaty monitoring bodies have not, however, been given 
authority to issue “freestanding legal interpretations divorced from 
the consideration of States Parties’ [periodic] reports.”168 In addition, 
as Michael O’Flaherty observed while serving on the HRC, some of 
the Committees’ concluding observations “bear little relationship to 
the list of issues” that the treaty bodies submit to states parties prior 
to reviewing the states’ periodic reports.169 Furthermore, although the 
treaty mandates limit the monitoring bodies’ comments to the states 
parties’ compliance with the relevant treaty, more recent comments 
“incorporate other treaties, conventions, and statements extraneous 
to the treaty, and their opinions often go far beyond the text of the 
treaty.”170 
                                                 
 166 Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 31; Human Rights Bodies, OHCHR, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/ Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2018). 
 167 Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 34 (internal citations omitted). 
 168 Id. at 44. 
 169 O’Flaherty, supra note 7. 
 170 Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 43, 45, 49; see also O′Flaherty, supra 
note 7 (“The non-binding nature of concluding observations is all the more evident 
when account is taken of the extent to which treaty bodies make recommendations 
on matters extraneous to the actual treaty obligations of the States Parties. . . .”). 
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In agreeing to the treaty provisions that created the 
monitoring bodies and determined the extent of their authority, 
nations envisioned treaty bodies that would engage in an objective 
evaluation of state compliance in connection with the states’ periodic 
reports.171 Instead, the treaty committees have exceeded the limits of 
their authority by reinterpreting treaty obligations and, in spite of the 
non-binding nature of their Comments and Concluding 
Observations, “authoritatively instruct[ing] . . . State Part[ies] to make 
detailed changes to . . . domestic laws and [even their] international 
obligations.”172 These activities arguably violate Article 2(7) of the 
U.N. Charter, which prohibits the U.N. from interfering in matters 
that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the states 
parties.173 
The CEDAW Committee, in particular, has far exceeded its 
mandate, aggressively policing states on the domestic matter of 
abortion, on the basis of questionable treaty interpretations.174 
O’Flaherty has criticized the CEDAW Committee for, like the HRC, 
citing external sources and raising issues extraneous to the CEDAW. 
He states that this practice “rais[es], at a minimum, issues of mandate 
and competency.”175 Former CEDAW Committee member, Dr. 
Krisztina Morvai, has also criticized the CEDAW Committee’s 
overstepping, “not[ing] that poorer countries ‘are regularly challenged 
about their human rights obligations and are often dependent on aid,’ 
                                                 
Michael O’Flaherty was a member of the Human Rights Committee when he wrote 
The Concluding Observations of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies. 
 171 Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at n.14 (citing the 1989 U.N. Secretary 
General as stating, in an official U.N. document, “In order to maintain a 
constructive emphasis on the nature of the work of the Committees and in order to 
facilitate a consensus-based approach, the treaty bodies have [correctly, in my view] 
sought to avoid any inference that they are passing judgment on the performance 
of a given State party on the basis of an examination of its report.”). 
 172 Id. at 40, 42-43. For example, in 2010, the Committee Against Torture 
instructed Liechtenstein to renegotiate a 1982 treaty it had concluded with Austria. 
Id. at 42. 
 173 See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 7. 
 174 Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 50. 
 175 Id. at 42. 
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which leaves them ‘particularly vulnerable’ to treaty body pressure to 
change their cultural norms.”176 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has also stepped 
beyond its mandate in an effort to interpret the CRC to require states 
to provide access to abortion.177 Although the CRC Committee’s 
mandate provides for “general recommendations” with respect to 
state party periodic reports, in 2001 the Committee began issuing 
thematic “general comments” disconnected from state submissions 
that, for example, “urg[e] states ‘to develop and implement 
programmes that provide access to sexual and reproductive health 
services, including . . . safe abortion services where abortion is not 
against the law. . . .’“178 In addition, the CRC Committee has invited 
NGOs to “days of thematic discussion” that yield “adopted 
recommendations.”179 This is precisely what the HRC did in 2015 in 
preparation for its Draft General Comment 36, which sought to 
redefine Article 6 (right to life) of the ICCPR to explicitly permit 
abortion and exclude unborn children from the Article’s 
protection.180 
Like the CEDAW Committee and the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child, the HRC has gone beyond the limits of its treaty-
based authority and “act[ed] ultra vires [in] seek[ing] to alter, add to, 
or diminish the rights recognized by the ICCPR.”181 Numerous 
                                                 
 176 Id. at n.79. 
 177 De Jesus, supra note 85, at 634-35. 
 178 See, e.g., id. at n.44 (citing Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General 
Comment No. 4 (2003)). 
 179 Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 173. 
[T]he CRC has certainly overstepped its mandate with its own organization and 
execution of “days of thematic discussion.” While it is permitted to request the 
General Assembly to recommend to the U.N. Secretary General that the Secretariat 
conduct “studies on specific issues relating to the rights of the child,” the CRC 
itself has held days of thematic discussion on eighteen occasions. In further 
contravention of its mandate, the CRC has “adopted recommendations” following 
the conclusion of each annual conference. Id. 
 180 See supra Section II.A.1.a.i. 
 181 Finegan, supra note 79, at 124 (“It is not clear whether the HRC 
believes that its abortion observations are incontrovertible, self-evident, and in 
need of no justification whatsoever, or whether it believes that it has the power to 
develop human rights law beyond . . . what is provided for in the ICCPR.”). 
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scholars, including some who support the HRC’s practices, 
acknowledge that the Committee has acted outside its mandate.182 
The treaty monitoring bodies have not engaged in these 
mandate excesses in isolation. As discussed below, “NGOs have 
been using treaty bodies as the backdoor to furthering their interests 
when domestic political efforts have met insurmountable 
resistance.”183 Cooperation with outside interests to transform treaty 
obligations surely was not what states anticipated when they agreed 
to monitoring bodies that would be comprised of impartial and 
independent experts of “high moral character and recognized 
competence in the field of human rights.”184 Even Michael 
O’Flaherty, while a member of the HRC, wrote that the accuracy and 
functionality of treaty body concluding observations was 
compromised, at least in part, by “the lack of independence or 
expertise of significant numbers of treaty body members.”185 
C. The Concerted Effort to Create a Right to Abortion 
In 1984, international human rights scholar Philip Alston 
prophetically wrote: 
As the perceived usefulness of attaching the label 
“human right” to a given goal or value increases, it 
can be expected that a determined effort will be made 
by a wide range of special interest groups to locate 
their cause under the banner of human rights. Thus, 
in the course of the next few years, UN organs will be 
under considerable pressure to proclaim new human 
rights without first having given adequate 
                                                 
 182 See id. at n.147; see also Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 41 (“[E]ven 
experts like Alston admit, giving treaty bodies the power to pressure States Parties 
to take a certain course of action fundamentally changes their role.”). 
 183 Pedone & Kloster, supra note 99, at 76. 
 184 ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 28(2); see also CRC, supra note 45, art. 43(2); 
CEDAW, supra note 96, art. 17(1). 
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consideration to their desirability, viability, scope or 
form.186 
Alston’s prediction has come to pass. By 1994, a movement 
was underway to create a right to abortion through non-legislative 
means. Reporting on her experience at the 1994 U.N. Conference on 
Population and Development in Cairo, Mary Ann Glendon stated 
that, “an abortion rights initiative led by a hard-edged U.S. delegation 
pushed all other population and development issues into the 
background.”187 The following year at the U.N. Fourth World 
Conference on Women in Beijing, Professor Glendon observed: 
A minority coalition, led by the powerful fifteen-
member European Union negotiating as a bloc, was 
pushing a version of the sexual and abortion rights 
agenda that had been rejected by the Cairo 
conference. The EU-led coalition was so intent on its 
unfinished Cairo agenda that it was stalling 
negotiations on other issues. Equally disturbing, the 
coalition was taking positions with ominous 
implications for universal human rights.188 
Notwithstanding these efforts, “the Beijing conference had 
no authority to add to or tinker with the corpus of universal human 
rights.”189 
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In 1996, a year after the Beijing conference, the lobbying 
relationship that Alston had foreseen between NGOs and treaty 
monitoring bodies played out in a conference in Glen Cove, New 
York.190 The gathering was organized and run by pro-choice 
lobbyists, such as the Center for Reproductive Rights (CRR). The 
lobbyists invited representatives from the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child, the HRC, the CEDAW Committee, the Committee 
against Torture, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, and the Committee on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights, as well as other U.N. representatives, all of whom 
attended in their official capacity.191 Financial support for the meeting 
was provided by the U.N. Population Fund (UNPF), the U.N. 
Division for the Advancement of Women, and the OHCHR, which 
oversees the treaty monitoring bodies192 and has promoted an 
international right to abortion.193 
The report that emerged from the meeting “outlin[ed] a 
strategy to force an international right to abortion.”194 For example, 
the report instructed the CEDAW Committee to “apply the right to 
non-discrimination on the ground of gender, in relation to the 
criminalization of medical procedures which are only needed by 
women, such as abortion.”195 At the meeting, members of the HRC 
also laid out a process for using various provisions of the ICCPR, 
including Article 6 (right to life) and Article 12 (the right to privacy), 
to support a right to abortion.196 The CEDAW Committee followed 
this strategy in General Comment 24, and the HRC Committee 
applied the strategy in Mellet v. Ireland, Whelan v. Ireland, and Draft 
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Comment 36, among numerous other comments, recommendations, 
and concluding observations.197 
This intertwining of NGO and U.N. interests goes even 
deeper: many of the U.N. officials in attendance at the Glen Cove 
meeting also held board positions at the time with one or more of the 
NGOs that were advocating for a right to abortion at the Glen Cove 
meeting.198 For example, while serving on the board of directors for 
the CRR, Nafis Sadik was also the executive director of the UNPF.199 
In addition, “at the time of the meeting half the members of the 
[CEDAW Committee] were simultaneously serving on the boards of 
one or more of the NGOs seeking to change the operation of the 
treaty bodies.”200 
The NGO-U.N. joint effort to establish a right to abortion 
was further exposed in 2003 when a series of internal CRR memos 
detailing a plan to create a right to abortion was leaked to the U.S. 
Congress.201 The memos boldly stated, “There is a stealth quality to 
the work . . . We are achieving incremental recognition of values 
without a huge amount of scrutiny from the opposition.”202 The CRR 
accurately described the effectiveness of their stealth efforts. In fact, 
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it was the CRR who in 2005, together with two Latin American pro-
choice NGOs, represented the young woman in K.L. v. Peru, in which 
the HRC proclaimed that Peru’s refusal to provide an abortion in a 
non-life-threatening pregnancy violated the woman’s rights to 
privacy, freedom from torture or CIDTP, and special care for 
minors.203 The CRR also filed the petitions for Amanda Mellet and 
Siobhán Whelan, in which the HRC determined, in 2016 and 2017, 
respectively, that Ireland’s domestic abortion laws violated rights to 
privacy, non-discrimination, and freedom from torture or CIDTP.204 
The CRR is not the only pro-choice lobbying group that has sought 
to push a right to abortion into international law through the U.N. 
treaty monitoring system. For example, the International Women’s 
Health Coalition has stated: 
The international conference and human rights 
documents . . . do not explicitly assert a woman’s 
right to abortion, nor do they legally require safe 
abortion services as an element of reproductive health 
care. Moreover, the ICPD [UN International 
Conference on Population and Development, 1994] 
and FWCW [Fourth World Conference on Women, 
1995] agreements recognize the wide diversity of 
national laws and the sovereignty of governments in 
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determining national laws and policies. Despite these 
qualifications, however, the conference documents 
and human rights instruments—if broadly interpreted and 
skillfully argued—can be very useful tools in efforts to 
expand access to safe abortion.205 
What pro-choice advocates and members of the U.N. treaty 
monitoring bodies seem to be seeking is not a woman’s ability to 
procure a safe abortion in connection with life-saving treatment for 
the mother, but an altogether unrestricted right to terminate the life 
of her child, at any point in the pregnancy and for any reason.206 For 
example, attorneys for CRR wrote: 
[S]ignificant progress has recently been made within 
international and regional human rights discourses 
requesting States Parties to liberalise abortion laws 
and actualise women′s right to safe abortion services. 
The recognition by treaty-monitoring bodies that 
restrictive abortion laws may force women to seek 
illegal, and hence, unsafe abortions which threaten 
their lives, can be used by advocates to support 
abortion on request or for socio-economic reasons.207 
Likewise, with respect to the 2016 case of Mellet v. Ireland, 
Professor Fiona De Londras argues that the HRC’s decision “not 
only further reinforces the need for constitutional change in Ireland 
in situations of fatal foetal abnormality, but in all situations where 
abortion is sought.”208 
In promoting an unrestricted right to abortion by extension 
from explicit treaty-guaranteed human rights, U.N. treaty committees 
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have told sovereign nations they “must provide women with the 
means to abort their unborn children in public medical facilities . . . 
generally whenever the unborn child is undesired.”209 As mentioned above, in 
2016 the Committee on the Rights of the Child urged Ireland to 
“[d]ecriminalize abortion in all circumstances and review its legislation 
with a view to ensuring access by children to safe abortion and post-abortion 
care services. . . .”210 It is ironic that the effort to establish a right to 
abortion is finding its basis in the very treaties that were born out of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which proclaims: “the 
inherent dignity and . . . the equal and inalienable rights of all members 
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in 
the world. . . .,”211 and yet the most vulnerable members of the 
human family—the unborn—are almost never mentioned in 
Committee communications. 
Treaty monitoring bodies fulfill a vital purpose when they 
remain within their mandate as “non-adversarial facilitator[s] [that] 
help States Parties examine their human rights records . . . [and] 
engage States Parties in a constructive dialogue on human rights 
issues pertinent to the treaty.”212 It is an altogether different scenario, 
however, when treaty monitoring bodies exceed their mandate and 
work in concert with special interest NGOs to create a human right 
that states never agreed to fulfill, and then repeatedly and openly 
criticize states for not measuring up to that expectation. At that 
point, the monitoring body loses credibility. While their pressure 
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tactics may be effective in cases of vulnerable nations dependent on 
international aid, once more resistant states parties start speaking up 
about treaty body overstepping, other nations may gain courage to 
resist as well. It is not surprising that some are calling for treaty body 
reform and denunciation of efforts to read a right to abortion into 
U.N. human rights treaties.213 
D.  State Pushback 
States have begun to push back against the effort to create a 
right to abortion out of established human rights. For example, at the 
2017 U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, the United States 
clearly stated its position that the right to abortion does not exist in 
international law and, while the United States “is the largest donor of 
bilateral reproductive health and family planning assistance,” such 
assistance will not include abortion services.214 Likewise, in spite of 
pressure U.N. Special Rapporteurs have aimed at Honduras to 
liberalize its national abortion laws, in 2017 the Honduran Parliament 
voted against such changes in legislation, seventy-seven to five, with 
eight abstentions.215 Pakistan and Cameroon have both stated that 
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pressure by the CEDAW Committee to change domestic abortion 
laws conflicts with their national consensus that a fetus is a child, 
children are a vital part of society, and abortion is murder.216 
Ireland has also asserted its sovereign prerogative to 
determine domestic law on abortion. In 2013, in response to the 
complaint filed with the U.N. Human Rights Committee in the 
matter of Mellet v. Ireland, Ireland asserted that its “constitutional and 
legislative framework reflects the nuanced and proportionate 
approach to the considered views of the Irish Electorate on the 
profound moral question of the extent to which the right to life of 
the foetus should be protected and balanced against the rights of the 
woman.”217 Nonetheless, Ireland paid Ms. Mellet an ex gratia sum of 
€30,000 (approximately $35,000 USD).218 Whether Ireland will offer 
payment to Siobhán Whelan, the complainant in the factually similar 
2017 HRC decision against Ireland, and other Irish women who have 
traveled out of the country for an abortion, remains to be seen.219 
More significant is the question of whether Ireland will vote in 2018 
to overturn its constitutional protection for unborn life, as the HRC 
claims the nation is obligated to do in order to comply with the 
Committee’s interpretation of the ICCPR.220 
IV. RIGHTS OF THE UNBORN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Pro-choice advocates and U.N. treaty monitoring bodies, 
offices, and agencies typically look at the abortion issue solely in the 
context of the mother’s rights. They neglect to consider that the U.N. 
human rights treaties ensuring the rights to life, to health, to be free 
from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and to 
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be free from discrimination—rights from which they seek to infer a 
right to abortion—arguably guarantee those same rights to the 
unborn. John Keown, professor at Georgetown University’s 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics, states that in researcher Rita Joseph’s 
book, Human Rights and the Unborn Child, 
Joseph argues cogently and clearly that an unborn 
child’s right to life is far more plausibly grounded in 
[international human rights treaties] than is a right to 
abortion . . . [;]however, . . . the unborn child’s rights 
have “been obscured for some decades now by the 
rise of a new pro-abortion ideology in the form of 
radical feminism,” which has conducted “a masterly 
campaign of ideological reinterpretation.”221 
Indeed, many parties to the relevant U.N. human rights 
treaties had domestic laws protecting unborn life at the time of 
ratification and did not intend that their treaty obligations would 
abrogate those laws.222 
An examination of the regional human rights systems’ 
treatment of abortion and the unborn is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, it is worth noting that though the Maputo Protocol 
in Africa, discussed above, recognizes a woman’s right to abortion 
under specific circumstances, the Inter-American human rights 
system’s American Convention on Human Rights protects an unborn 
person’s right to life from the moment of conception.223 The 
American Convention states, “Every person has the right to have his 
life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, 
from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived 
of his life.”224 As of June 2017, twenty-three of thirty-five 
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Organization of American States parties have ratified the American 
Convention.225 
A. Rights of the Unborn in U.N. Treaties 
As discussed in supra Part II of this paper, neither global 
human rights treaties nor customary international law recognize a 
right to abortion. Where U.N. treaty monitoring bodies, offices, and 
agencies assert such a right as inferred from any right but the 
mother’s competing right to life, such an assertion pits the most 
essential human right—the right to life—against inferior rights, such 
as health, privacy, and freedom from discrimination.226 U.N. treaty 
monitoring bodies, offices, and agencies often avoid this conflict by 
not discussing the unborn at all, in spite of treaty language that 
supports the inclusion of the unborn as human beings entitled to 
dignity and human rights. On the rare occasion that a U.N. 
publication does mention the competing rights of the unborn, it 
unilaterally denies such rights without a sound explanation.227 
1. The Right to Life 
a. Under the UDHR 
The preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
states that “all members of the human family” have inherent dignity, 
and therefore “equal and inalienable rights.”228 Given that science 
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establishes that the unborn are “human beings” from the moment of 
conception,229 the UDHR arguably supports their inclusion in the 
Declaration’s protections. In addition, Article 3 states, “Everyone has 
the right to life, liberty and security of person.”230 This broad wording 
“enshrines the right to life in a manner that has left it vulnerable to 
interpretation by abortion opponents who argue that a fetus is 
included in ‘everyone’ and, therefore, abortion would be a violation 
of the Declaration.”231 
On the other hand, pro-choice advocates have argued that 
Article 1’s statement that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights” precludes an interpretation of the UDHR that 
includes the unborn.232 They consider the drafters’ rejection of a 
proposal to remove the term “born” as evidence of an intentional 
exclusion of the unborn from the UDHR’s protections.233 However, 
“as Johannes Morsink shows in his study into the origins of the 
UDHR, debates over the retention or rejection of the term ‘born’ did 
not center on the question of abortion or the moral status of fetal 
life, but on whether human rights are inherent to human nature or, 
instead, are attributed to human beings from some source extrinsic to 
their very existence, such as society or law.”234 In fact, the travaux 
record that René Cassin, one of proposers of the term, as well as 
                                                 
 229 See When Human Life Begins, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PEDIATRICIANS 
(Mar. 2017), https://www.acpeds.org/the-college-speaks/position-statements/life-
issues/when-human-life-begins, explaining that: 
The predominance of human biological research confirms that human life begins at 
conception—fertilization. At fertilization, the human being emerges as a whole, 
genetically distinct, individuated zygotic living human organism, a member of the 
species Homo sapiens, needing only the proper environment in order to grow and 
develop. The difference between the individual in its adult stage and in its zygotic 
stage is one of form, not nature. 
 230 UDHR, supra note 37, art. 3 (emphasis added). 
 231 Choudhury, supra note 34, at 283. 
 232 UDHR, supra note 37, art. 1; Finegan, supra note 79, at 93. 
 233 See, e.g., Zampas & Gher, supra note 7. 
 234 Finegan, supra note 79, at 93-94. The inclusion of the term “born” 
“echoes Rousseau’s Social Contract and Article 1 of the 1789 French Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, which Rousseau helped inspire (‘Men are 
born and remain free and equal in rights’).” Id. at 95. “Rousseau’s moral opposition 
to abortion indicates that he had no difficulty employing “born” as a signifier 
without implying that the value of “humanity” has no pre-natal application.” Id. 
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Chilean delegate Hernan Santa Cruz, who also supported its 
inclusion, both stated their approval of including the unborn as 
holders of human rights during the drafting of the Declaration.235 
Likewise, Charles Malik, the Lebanese delegate, requested that the 
summary record reflect that the Chinese, Soviet, and English 
delegates’ desire to omit the phrase “from the moment of 
conception” from the UDHR’s recognition of the right to life was 
from an interest in textual concision.236 Moreover, the three delegates 
considered inclusion of the unborn “to be implied in the general 
terms of [Article 3].”237 While there was a discussion of explicitly 
extending the right to life to the unborn, the proposal was rejected 
out of consideration for the fact that some nations allowed abortion 
under certain circumstances, as well as from a desire tomaintain 
brevity in the language of the UDHR.238 Accordingly, considering the 
UDHR’s preamble, text, and travaux, the Declaration could be 
interpreted to permit, but not necessarily require, inclusion of the 
unborn in the right to life. To interpret the Declaration or its 
derivative human rights instruments to include a right to abortion, 
however, requires an interpretive stretch that involves several 
intratextual contradictions.239 
b. Under the ICCPR 
In broad language that echoes the UDHR, Article 6(1) of the 
ICCPR states, “Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right 
shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
life.”240 As the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) has stated, the right to life enunciated in Article 6 
                                                 
 235 Finegan, supra note 79, at 95-96. 
 236 Id. at 96-97. 
 237 Id. At this point in the drafting history, present-day Article 3 was draft 
Article 4. Id. at 96. 
 238 Id. at 96. Finegan notes that “no delegate argued in favor of retaining 
the term ‘born’ on the basis that it meant that only actual physically born human 
beings could claim human rights.” Id. at 94. 
 239 See, e.g., infra Section IV.A.1.b. (discussing the prohibition against 
applying the death penalty to a pregnant convict in the context of the ICCPR) and 
notes 266-70 (regarding sex-selective abortion and gender discrimination, which is 
prohibited by Article 7 of the UDHR). 
 240 ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 6(1) (emphasis added). 
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of the ICCPR “is the supreme right from which no derogation is 
permitted even in time of public emergency which threatens the life 
of the nation (art. 4).”241 The inclusion of unborn human beings in 
Article 6(1)’s protections logically flows from Article 6(5)’s 
prohibition against imposing the death penalty upon pregnant 
women. 
Article 6(5) of the ICCPR states, “[The] [s]entence of death 
shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below 
eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant 
women.”242 A harmonious interpretation of Article 6(1)’s broadly 
stated right to life and Article 6(5)’s prohibition recognizes the status 
of the unborn child as a human being separate from his or her 
mother. Any other interpretation would render the prohibition 
meaningless. Accordingly, “it is more plausible to judge that Article 
6(1) protects the right to life of the unborn to some indeterminate 
extent than to judge that it does not protect the right to life of the 
unborn to any extent.”243 A legal scholar who studied the entire 
ICCPR legislative history found that the drafters specifically included 
Article 6(5)’s prohibition “out of consideration for ‘the interests of 
the unborn child.’“244 Several other scholars have reached the same 
conclusion based on their reading of the travaux.245 One draft of the 
ICCPR specifically states, “The principal reason for providing . . . 
that the death sentence should not be carried out on pregnant 
                                                 
 241 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 6, art.6, ¶ 1 (16th 
session, 1982), http://www.refworld.org/ 
docid/45388400a.html. 
 242 ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 6(5). 
 243 Finegan, supra note 79, at 107. 
 244 Id. at 108. Finnegan states: 
What becomes clear from reading the entirety of the debates is the extent to which 
supporters of the provision based their support on the full humanity of the unborn 
child. Delegates from Peru, Indonesia, India, Canada, Israel, and Japan each 
referenced the need to protect either the “child” or “children” or “persons” from 
the death penalty, while referring specifically to the unborn. The provision was 
adopted by fifty-three votes to five, with fourteen abstentions. No delegate voiced 
opposition to the paragraph on the grounds that it protected the unborn child. 
Id. 
 245 Id. 
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women was to save the life of an innocent unborn child.”246 
Furthermore, Article 6(5) does not specify a point in the prenatal 
human being’s development at which the prohibition becomes 
operative: it applies from the moment of conception. Article 6(1)’s 
right to life should include the unborn so as to not render Article 
6(5)’s prohibition meaningless. 
The Human Rights Committee fails to reconcile the 
contradiction between excluding unborn human beings from Article 
6(1)’s right to life and Article 6(5)’s prohibition against applying the 
death penalty to pregnant women. In Draft Comment 36, the 
Committee states, “The special protection afforded to pregnant 
women stems from an interest in protecting the rights and interests 
of affected family members, including the the [sic] unborn fetus and the 
fetus’s father.”247 The HRC then contradicts itself, stating, “the 
Committee cannot assume that Article 6 imposes on State parties an 
obligation to recognize the right to life of unborn children.”248 How 
is it that the competing rights of an unborn human being, as well as 
the rights of his or her father, conflict with the killing of the unborn 
child (at no specified stage of the child’s development) in the context 
of the execution of a criminally convicted mother, but not in the 
context of a mother’s right to abort her child in any other 
situation?249 This logical impasse stems from the fact that “abortion, 
insofar as it is successful, always involves ‘the deliberate killing of an 
innocent human being.’“250 
c. Under the CRC 
While the travaux and a harmonious reading of the provisions 
of the ICCPR support an interpretation of the Covenant that 
includes prenatal human beings in the right to life, the Convention on 
                                                 
 246 G.A. Rep. of the Third Comm., 12th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/3764 (Dec. 6, 
1957), http://dag.un.org/handle/11176 /289512?show=full. 
 247 Draft General Comment No. 36, supra note 66, ¶ 50 (emphasis added). 
 248 Id. ¶ 7. 
 249 See supra Section II.A.1 (discussing abortion and the mother’s right to 
life). 
 250 John M. Breen, Love, Truth, and the Economy: A Reflection on Benedict XVI’s 
Caritas in Veritate, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 987, 1006 (2010). 
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the Rights of the Child explicitly recognizes the unborn as holders of 
human rights. Through Article 6(1) of the CRC, “States Parties 
recognize that every child has the inherent right to life.”251 Article 1 
defines a “child” for purposes of the Convention as “every human being 
below the age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the 
child, majority is attained earlier.”252 As others have noted, Article 1’s 
definition provides a ceiling, but not a floor, in terms of the age of 
the child who is to be included in the Convention’s protections.253 
Furthermore, the preamble states that “the child, by reason of his 
physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, 
including appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth.”254 
Although the CRC’s text, especially in light of the preamble, provides 
strong support for the inclusion of the unborn as children entitled to 
protection of the right to life, the travaux of the CRC indicate that 
the drafters did not intend to forbid abortion in every situation, as 
the domestic laws of some of the negotiating states allowed abortion 
under certain circumstances.255 Nonetheless, in the VCLT’s hierarchy 
                                                 
 251 CRC, supra note 45, art. 6(1) (emphasis added). 
 252 Id. art. 1. 
 253 See, e.g., Rutkow & Lozman, supra note 31, at 186. 
 254 CRC, supra note 45, pmbl. ¶ 9 (emphasis added). While the preamble 
itself is not legally binding on states parties, the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties instructs that “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context 
and in the light of its object and purpose” and that the preamble is one of three 
parts of the treaty, along with the text and annexes, that comprise the treaty’s 
“context.” VCLT, supra note 82, art 31(1)-(2). See Janoff, supra note 82, at 168-69 
(noting that the preambular reference to the unborn child informs the definition of 
“child” for purposes of the Convention’s protections). See also Finegan, supra note 
79, at 117 (“The preamble to a treaty, as Alston acknowledges, enunciates the 
broad general principles relevant to the treaty. The ninth preambular paragraph [of 
the CRC] thus enunciates the principle that what proceeds it concerns all children, 
born and unborn. No article of the UNCRC comes close to contradicting this 
principle.”). But see Stewart, supra note 31, at 167 (“The Convention cannot fairly be 
read to require legislative action to protect the fetus because the text of Article 6 is 
silent on this subject, despite the reference in the ninth preambular 
paragraph. . . .”). Stewart supports this position by referencing the travaux, which 
indicate that “a credible effort was made during the drafting process to ensure that 
the Convention is ‘abortion neutral.’“ Id. at 178. 
 255 See Stewart, supra note 31, at 178 (“A credible effort was made during 
the drafting process to ensure that the Convention is ‘abortion neutral.’“); see also 
Finegan, supra note 79, at 120-21. Finegan concedes that 
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of interpretive aids, the “preamble ranks higher than the travaux as a 
hermeneutic key.”256 
In addition to the preamble and the travaux, the VCLT 
provides that reference may be made to the states parties’ subsequent 
practice when interpreting a treaty.257 Given the range of CRC states 
parties’ positions on abortion and the status of the unborn, 
subsequent practice is not dispositive on whether the term “child” 
includes the unborn.258 The varied subsequent practice may indicate, 
however, that the states parties intended to allow each state to 
balance the unborn person’s right to life with the adolescent mother’s 
rights. Overall, given the preamble’s clear inclusion of the unborn as 
being entitled to legal protection, as well as the VCLT’s hierarchy of 
interpretive methods, there is more support for the CRC’s protection 
of the unborn than not. 
2. Other Rights in U.N. Human Rights Treaties 
While certain rights obviously do not apply to a prenatal 
person, such as the freedom from arbitrary arrest or the freedom to 
dispose of wealth, states may consider rights such as the right to 
health and the right to be free from torture and from cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment (CIDT) as applicable to unborn human 
                                                 
it remains unwarranted to claim that the UNCRC protects the unborn child’s right 
to life to an extent that renders all forms of abortion impermissible. A thorough 
analysis of the travaux precludes such a conclusion, since sensitivities over 
domestic abortion laws were the reason for omitting an even more explicit 
affirmation of the human rights of unborn children. So it is partially correct to 
describe the final text of the UNCRC as a compromise of sorts. Yet it was very far 
from an entirely neutral compromise, as the unborn child’s status as a bearer of 
human rights was explicitly recognized even if the implications of this status vis-a-
vis abortion, in particular, were not positively unpacked with the degree of 
specificity and precision associated with statute law. 
Id. 
 256 Finegan, supra note 79, at 118. Article 32 of the VCLT allows recourse 
“to the supplementary means of interpretation ‘in order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of Article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to Article 31 leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” Id. 
 257 See VCLT, supra note 82, art. 31(3)(b). 
 258 See supra Section II.B. 
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beings where interpretive methods under the VCLT do not yield a 
contrary result. 
The right to freedom from torture or CIDT is an especially 
relevant right for the unborn human being, considering the early 
gestational point at which a baby can feel the extreme pain inherent 
to abortion techniques.259 In fact, as of March 2016, twelve states 
within the United States of America prohibit abortion after twenty 
weeks because of fetal pain.260 Recognizing the medical reality of fetal 
pain, Utah requires physicians to administer anesthesia to prenatal 
children of twenty gestational weeks or later prior to their abortion.261 
On October 3, 2017, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the 
Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, which would ban most 
abortions after the twentieth week of pregnancy.262 
                                                 
 259 See Doctors on Fetal Pain, supra note 137. 
 260 Ashley Fantz, Utah Passes ‘Fetal Pain’ Abortion Law Requiring Anesthesia, 
CNN (Mar. 29, 2016, 3:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/03/29/health/utah-
abortion-law-fetal-pain/index.html. 
 261 Id. While CNN is quick to denounce the Utah bill’s recognition of fetal 
pain, the medical concept is well-documented. For example, in 2011 the Harvard 
Mahoney Neuroscience Institute published an article noting that 
various studies published in the early 1980s reported finding a high density of a 
chemical messenger called substance P in areas of the fetal brain associated with 
pain perception and response. Although substance P is one of several 
neurotransmitters in the central nervous system, it is the only one shown 
to play a role in transmitting pain impulses. 
THE HARVARD MAHONEY NEUROSCIENCE INSTITUTE LETTER, THE LONG LIFE 
OF EARLY PAIN 2 (2001), https://hms.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/HMS 
_OTB_Winter11_Vol17_No1.pdf; see also Johnnye S. Johnson, Fetal Pain: Life in 
Troubled Waters, 16 J PERINATAL EDUC. 44, 45 (2007) (“The belief . . . that fetuses 
. . . ‘feel no pain’ is not true. It is, in fact, a tragic medical myth, one that 
professional groups such as the American Academy of Pediatrics (2000) and the 
National Association of Neonatal Nurses have worked in recent years to debunk.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 262 Mike DeBonis and Jenna Johnson, With Trump’s Backing, House Approves 
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In addition to the physical torture a baby experiences in an 
abortion, at least by the twenty-week stage of development, medical 
evidence has shown that the unborn human being is capable of 
suffering psychological or emotional trauma.263 It is hard to imagine 
that the experience of being injected with a feticide that causes a 
heart attack or being “torn limb from limb,” as occurs in the “dilation 
and evacuation” method of abortion, would not wreak emotional 
havoc on a human being that rises to the level of torture or cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment.264 U.N. treaty monitoring bodies 
should at least balance these facts against their efforts to infer a right 
to abortion through the mother’s right to privacy and other rights of 
the mother that should carry less weight than freedom from torture 
or CIDT. 
3. The Prohibition Against Discrimination 
All the principal human rights treaties prohibit denying the 
rights guaranteed therein on the basis of discrimination. For example, 
                                                 
 263 See Johnson, supra note 260, at 45 . 
 264 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy described the “dilation 
and evacuation” method of abortion as follows: The fetus, in many cases, dies just 
as a human adult or child would: It bleeds to death as it is torn from limb from 
limb. The fetus can be alive at the beginning of the dismemberment process and 
can survive for a time while its limbs are being torn off. Dr. Carhart agreed that 
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at the time just prior to removal of the portion of the fetus, . . . the fetus [is] alive.” 
Dr. Carhart has observed fetal heartbeat via ultrasound with “extensive parts of the 
fetus removed,” and testified that mere dismemberment of a limb does not always 
cause death because he knows of a physician who removed the arm of a fetus only 
to have the fetus go on to be born “as a living child with one arm.” At the 
conclusion of a D&E abortion no intact fetus remains. In Dr. Carhart’s words, the 
abortionist is left with “a tray full of pieces. 
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 958-959 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined 
by Rehnquist, C.J. (internal citations omitted)). See also The Basics, DOCTORS ON 
FETAL PAIN, http://www.doctorsonfetalpain.com/fetal-pain-the-evidence/ (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2018). The other common method of abortion is by injection of 
digoxin into the baby’s heart, causing a fatal heart attack, after which “[t]he dead 
baby is then removed from his or her mother by dismemberment.” Id. Only 
seventeen of the fifty U.S. states ban abortion after the twentieth week of 
pregnancy. See State Policy Updates Major Develops in Sexual and Reproductive Health, 
GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore 
/state-policies-later-abortions (last visited Feb. 23, 2018). 
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Article 2(1) of the CRC prohibits discrimination on any basis, 
instructing states parties to 
respect and ensure the rights set forth in the [CRC] to 
each child within their jurisdiction without 
discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s 
or his or her parent’s or legal guardian’s race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, 
birth or other status.265 
Many children are aborted on the basis of disability that is 
detected in utero.266 It could be argued that domestic laws that permit 
abortion in the case of disability, but would otherwise disallow 
abortion in the particular situation, promote a violation of the unborn 
human being’s right to be free from discrimination. As an alternative 
to such discrimination, states could address the undeniable challenges 
mothers face in raising a child with disabilities by providing support 
services that meet the mother’s and child’s needs in each unique 
situation. 
Abortion can also constitute a violation of the prenatal 
human being’s rights on the basis of gender discrimination. In 2006, 
the Committee on the Rights of the Child published General 
Comment No. 7, Implementing Child Rights in Early Childhood, 
explicitly identifying sex-selective abortion as a violation of the 
unborn girl’s human rights, specifically her right to life. The General 
Comment states, “Discrimination against girl children is a serious 
violation of rights, affecting their survival and all areas of their young 
lives as well as restricting their capacity to contribute positively to 
                                                 
 265 CRC, supra note 45, art. 2(1) (emphasis added). 
 266 For example, in the United Kingdom, ninety percent of women who 
discover their child has Down’s syndrome choose to abort. Alison Gee, A World 
Without Down’s Syndrome?, BBC NEWS MAGAZINE (Sept. 29, 2016), 
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the Foetus, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/abortion/philosophical/disability 
.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2018). 
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society.”267 As an example of discrimination that violates a female 
child’s rights, the Committee then states, “They may be victims of 
selective abortion. . . .”268 Likewise, the outcome document for the Cairo 
conference identified sex-selective abortion as discrimination against 
female children, which the document described as “harmful and 
unethical.”269 Similarly, the outcome document for the 1995 Beijing 
conference stated, “Acts of violence against women also include . . . 
prenatal sex selection.”270 
It is hard to reconcile how aborting a child on the basis of 
gender is “harmful and unethical,” a “serious violation of rights,” and 
“violence against women,” while U.N. treaty committees and certain 
U.N. offices and agencies, such as the WHO and OCHCR, consider 
it a mother’s right to abort her child on other grounds. Moreover, in 
light of the Cairo and Beijing outcome documents’ general negative 
comments about abortion, as well as their condemnation of sex-
selective abortion, it is ironic that the U.N. treaty committees and 
pro-choice NGOs continue to cite the conference documents in 
support of an inferred right to abortion.271 
B. Customary International Law and Protection for the Unborn 
Considering the wide range of state positions on abortion, 
there is not sufficiently consistent state practice to establish a global 
customary rule of law regarding the unborn human being’s right to 
life.272 There may, however, be a regional custom of recognizing the 
rights of the unborn. For example, in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, “state practice . . . subsequent to the ratification of the 
[Convention on the Rights of the Child], demonstrates that states 
                                                 
 267 U.N. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 7: 
Implementing Child Rights in Early Education, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/7/Rev.1, ¶ 
11.b.i (Sept. 20, 2006), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ 
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 269 Cairo Conference, supra note 91, at 34. 
 270 Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, Sept. 4-15, 1995, 
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parties . . . have consistently understood it to ban elective abortion, in 
spite of CRC Committee recommendations to the contrary, and to 
mandate state protection of unborn life throughout pregnancy, from 
conception to birth.”273 
V. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE BACKDOOR PUSH 
FOR A RIGHT TO ABORTION 
As already discussed, the non-legislative attempt to create a 
right to abortion produces numerous problems: violations of state 
sovereignty; loss of U.N. treaty body legitimacy; practical issues of 
state fulfillment of a right to abortion, such as violating the right to 
conscientious objection of medical professionals, owners of medical 
facilities, and private insurance companies; and, most importantly, a 
violation of the competing rights of the unborn child. In addition to 
these issues, the backdoor push to create a right to abortion threatens 
to devalue other human rights by dilution, stymies human rights 
progress in other areas, and could eventually create a schism wherein 
human rights are no longer considered universal.274 
A. Devaluation of Existing Human Rights 
The assertion of an inferred right to abortion threatens to 
devalue the human rights that states carefully negotiated and 
explicitly agreed to recognize in binding human rights treaties. In 
Professor Stephen P. Marks’ words, “[I]t would weaken the idea of 
human rights in general if numerous claims or values were 
indiscriminately proclaimed as human rights.”275 Accordingly, 
professor Marks recommends stringent standards for new rights, 
including enforceability and non-infringement of already existing 
rights.276 
The proclamation by treaty monitoring bodies of a right to 
abortion, without a basis in international law and in contravention of 
                                                 
 273 De Jesus, supra note 85, at 606. 
 274 JAKOB CORNIDES, NATURAL AND UN-NATURAL LAW 5 (2010), 
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states’ domestic legislation, fails to meet Professor Marks’ criteria. 
First, as argued in supra Section II.A, the assertion of a right to 
abortion could present significant enforcement challenges, such as 
requiring states to supply sufficient and accessible abortion 
practitioners and facilities despite funding limitations and potentially 
in violation of the states’ domestic laws. Second, a proclamation of a 
right to abortion could also infringe established rights of freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion, and potentially freedom of 
expression or opinion.277 Hopefully as states push back against the 
surreptitious effort to assert a right to abortion, the U.N. and pro-
choice NGOs will consider addressing the issue in a forthright 
manner that honors state commitments to human rights treaties and 
preserves the value of the rights those instruments explicitly 
guarantee. 
B. Loss of Human Rights Progress in Other Areas 
The backdoor effort to create a right to abortion 
compromises progress in other areas of human rights by absorbing 
an inordinate amount of U.N. treaty body attention, as seen in the 
countless Committee communications that have focused on this 
issue.278 In addition, the dogged attempt to create a right to abortion 
has shifted discussions at U.N. conferences away from other human 
rights issues. This is precisely what occurred at the 1994 U.N. 
Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, “where an 
abortion rights initiative . . . pushed all other population and 
                                                 
 277 See, e.g., text accompanying supra notes 101-03, 105-10 & 125. Professor 
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development issues into the background.”279 Likewise, at a 2011 
General Assembly meeting, numerous nations criticized the HRC 
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health for ignoring his mandate 
by neglecting critical health issues, such as hunger and disease, and 
instead focusing his report on the “non-existent right to abortion.”280 
The Special Rapporteur was also criticized for his “systematic 
attempts to reinterpret internationally agreed conventions and to 
disregard intergovernmental documents in which the right to health 
and its derived rights had been clearly defined. . . .”281 
Perhaps the most poignant illustration of the waste of 
international resources caused by the push for a right to abortion was 
the failure, for the first time in history, to adopt an outcome 
document at the 2015 U.N. Commission on Population and 
Development (UNCPD).282 The UNCPD is an annual meeting at 
U.N. Headquarters to discuss progress toward fulfilling the goals of 
the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development 
in Cairo.283 The reason for the 2015 failure was that countries could 
not reach consensus on the right to abortion. On one side, there were 
“strong appeals to have sexual and reproductive health and rights 
embedded in the outcome document.”284 On the other side, states felt 
“harassed” and “discredited” by the U.N. Population Fund with 
respect to their national abortion legislation.285 
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In 2017, the Commission again was unable to reach 
consensus on the outcome document, due in large part to 
disagreement about a right to abortion.286 Commission Chair Alya 
Ahmed Saif al-Thani described this as “a major failure.”287 On the 
pro-abortion rights side of the 2017 UNCPD, the Assistant 
Secretary-General for Policy Coordination in the Department of 
Social and Economic Affairs referenced the “‘unfinished business’ of 
the Cairo Agenda,” meaning the effort to “ensure sexual and 
reproductive health rights,” including abortion.288 Russia’s 
representative summed up the opposing side’s perspective that 
“pushing sexual and reproductive health rights as indivisible from 
human rights was nothing but an attempt to undermine international 
agreements on human rights.”289 He considered that “[s]uch 
formulations diluted basic human rights, which only discredited the 
Commission’s work [and] express[ed] opposition to use of the 
Commission as a ‘back door’ through which to force various human 
rights concepts that did not meet the broader consensus.”290 
The effort to create a right to abortion also stymies human 
rights progress by discouraging states from ratifying human rights 
treaties to which they might agree but for the well-founded concern 
that U.N. bodies, and even other nations, would try to read a right to 
abortion into the treaty commitments. The United States, for 
example, has declined to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child in large part because of concerns that ratification will impact 
U.S. abortion laws291 as well as raise federalism concerns.292 Likewise, 
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abortion concerns have at least partly influenced the United States’ 
decision to not ratify the CEDAW and the ICESCR.293 
C. Danger of Withdrawal or Schism 
Given the strong resentment some states have toward efforts 
by U.N. treaty monitoring bodies, agencies, and special rapporteurs 
to interpret human rights treaties to include a right to abortion, some 
states may choose to withdraw from the treaties altogether.294 
International law scholars have taken notice of this possibility. As 
Duke Professor Laurence Helfer has stated, “overlegalizing human 
rights can lead even liberal democracies to reconsider their 
commitment to international institutions that protect those rights.”295 
Likewise, UCLA Law professor Randall Peerenboom has noticed 
that “fault lines have become readily apparent as the human rights 
movement has gained in power and attempted to enforce increasingly 
specific interpretations of rights.”296 Professor Pereenboom has 
further observed that “[t]he growing power of the international 
human rights movement has led to a backlash as countries have 
begun to feel the movement’s bite.”297 Should the resistant states’ 
resentment continue to grow, what is now a division with the 
potential to cause treaty withdrawals may, in the words of a 
European Commission official, reach the point of “schism in the 
world of legal thought [whereby] human rights would no longer be 
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universal.”298 The need for a better approach to abortion and the 
rights of the unborn could not be more evident.299 
VI. THE NEED FOR CLARIFICATION: USING AN AMENDMENT OR 
OPTIONAL PROTOCOLS TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT BETWEEN 
ABORTION AND PROTECTION OF THE UNBORN IN U.N. HUMAN 
RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 
The backdoor attempt to create a right to abortion through 
inference has produced division and resentment in the international 
community, absorbed resources at the expense of other attention-
worthy issues, and caused a host of other problems.300 Although the 
strategy has successfully pressured some states into changing their 
abortion laws,301 other states continue to resist, and the acrimony 
seems to be mounting, as seen in the 2015 and 2017 UNCPD failures 
to reach consensus.302 Given that pro-choice NGOs and treaty 
monitoring bodies do not appear to be backing down, perhaps the 
international community is ready to reaffirm the traditional and 
universally accepted way of creating international law: through 
contracts made by willing sovereign nations.303 
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If states parties to the relevant U.N. human rights treaties 
could definitively settle the matter of abortion and the rights of the 
unborn, then the international community could move forward and 
turn their attention to issues that have been neglected for the 
preoccupation with abortion. States would likely reach consensus at 
the UNCPD once again, and the vast flow of resources that the U.N., 
states, and NGOs have spent to push for an international right to 
abortion could be redirected to issues such as disease, hunger, and 
education. In addition, nations, such as the United States, would 
likely be more open to ratifying U.N. human rights treaties once the 
debate and uncertainty regarding abortion and the rights of the 
unborn are finally put to rest. With the adoption of treaty committee 
ethics guidelines and mandate clarification, the U.N. treaty 
compliance system could regain integrity and therefore become more 
effective in fulfilling its original purpose of helping nations meet their 
treaty obligations.304 
There are two options for legislatively settling the issue of 
abortion and rights of the unborn under the existing human rights 
treaties: amendment and the adoption of optional protocols. Well-
resourced nations with the strongest positions on abortion and rights 
of the unborn are perhaps the most likely candidates for leading 
efforts to alter treaty agreements through amendments or additional 
protocols, as they are less vulnerable to international pressure. 
A.  Amendment to Existing Human Rights Treaties 
Through an amendment, U.N. human rights treaties could 
explicitly clarify that abortion and the rights of the unborn are left to 
each individual state or establish some basic parameters for these 
issues. The relevant U.N. treaties for abortion and rights of the 
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unborn are the ICCPR, ICESCR, CRC, CAT, CRPD, and CEDAW. 
The first five of these six instruments describe the amendment 
procedure with some detail. The CEDAW does not refer to 
“amendments” per se, but does give a very brief description of the 
process for “revisions,” stating that any state party may, at any time, 
submit to the U.N. Secretary General a written request for revision to 
the CEDAW.305 Upon receipt of a revision request, the CEDAW 
simply states that the U.N. General Assembly “shall decide upon the 
steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such a request.”306 
The more detailed amendment procedure for the other five 
relevant treaties is essentially the same for each instrument.307 Any 
state party to the treaty may file an amendment request with the U.N. 
Secretary General.308 The Secretary General then communicates the 
proposed amendment to each state party and requests notification of 
whether the state party agrees to a conference for the purpose of 
discussing and voting on the proposed amendment.309 If one-third of 
the states parties agree to the conference, the Secretary General will 
convene the meeting under the auspices of the United Nations.310 
Should a majority of the states that are present vote in favor of the 
amendment, it will go to the General Assembly for a vote.311 The 
amendment enters into force upon approval by the General 
Assembly and acceptance by two-thirds of the states parties to the 
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treaty.312 The amendment binds only the states parties that have 
accepted it.313 
One of the risks of seeking an amendment that leaves matters 
of abortion and rights of the unborn completely in the discretion of 
each state party is that states could use the amendment to justify 
extreme behavior at either end of the abortion debate. For example, 
some states may choose not to balance the mother’s right to life 
against that of her unborn child where life-saving treatment for the 
mother involves the foreseen but undesired loss of her child.314 On 
the other end of the spectrum, without some restrictions, states could 
allow for particularly brutal scenarios such as late-term abortion315 or 
practices that shock the conscience, such as conception solely for the 
purpose of aborting and selling the child for fetal tissue research, as 
was proposed in the Harvard Journal of Law and Gender.316 
To guard against these undesirable extremes, an amendment 
to the relevant human rights treaties could set forth basic limitations 
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with respect to abortion and rights of the unborn. Given that only a 
few countries prohibit abortion where the procedure is determined to 
be necessary to save the mother’s life, it is likely that the General 
Assembly and two-thirds of the states parties to the ICCPR, 
ICESCR, CRC, CAT, CRPD, and CEDAW317 would agree to an 
amendment that permitted the more restrictive parameter of life-
saving treatment for the mother that involved the foreseeable but 
unintentional death of the unborn child.318 Likewise, at the other end 
of the spectrum, as of 2014 only four states allow abortion on 
demand after the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy.319 Accordingly, it 
is likely that the General Assembly and two-thirds of the states 
parties to the relevant U.N. human rights treaties would agree to 
prohibit abortion on demand after the twenty-fourth week of 
pregnancy. 
B. Adoption of Optional Protocols 
As an alternative to treaty amendments, states parties to the 
ICCPR, ICESCR, CRC, CAT, CRPD, and CEDAW could explicitly 
set forth their position on abortion and rights of the unborn in two 
optional protocols. An optional protocol is a treaty by its own right, 
and only the states parties to the original treaty who also ratify or 
accede to the protocol are bound by it.320 One protocol could 
explicitly set forth a woman’s right to abortion and relevant 
limitations, and a second protocol could set forth the rights of the 
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unborn as they relate to specific provisions of the treaty. While it 
would be contradictory to have opposing protocols to the same 
treaty, the preambular language of the protocols would include the 
rationale for the protocols. 
Thus far, optional protocols have been a more common 
procedure than amendments for modifying U.N. human rights 
treaties, and only protocols have been used to make substantive 
changes to treaty commitments.321 Three protocols have given states 
parties the option to modify substantive provisions of human rights 
treaties: the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty;322 the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict;323 and 
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography.324 
As with amendments, the use of optional protocols to clarify 
rights pertaining to abortion and unborn human beings risks creating 
undesirable interpretations at both ends of the abortion debate. 
However extreme interpretations could be preempted through 
carefully chosen textual language. Optional protocols on abortion 
and rights of the unborn also risk contributing to human rights 
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dilution, as argued in Section V.A; however, this risk is higher in a 
protocol creating a new right to abortion than in a protocol that 
extends already-existing rights to the unborn. In any case, these risks 
are arguably outbalanced by the manifold benefits of finally closing 
the backdoor effort to create a right to abortion. As an additional 
consideration, both protocols should provide a withdrawal clause to 
give states liberty to alter their international commitments if states 
change their domestic policy on these controversial issues. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Given the great divide among states regarding abortion and 
the rights of the unborn, as well as the numerous harms that the 
backdoor effort to assert a right to abortion has caused, international 
law’s best option is to legally clarify these issues. This could be done 
through an amendment recognizing, with limits, that abortion and 
the rights of the unborn are decidedly left to each sovereign state, or 
more likely, through optional protocols to the relevant human rights 
treaties. This would promote state sovereignty and U.N. treaty 
monitoring body integrity, preserve the value of explicitly provided-
for human rights, and lessen the likelihood of treaty withdrawal or a 
schism in which human rights are no longer considered universal. In 
addition, clarification on abortion and rights of the unborn would 
allow the international community to turn its attention and resources 
to global issues that have been overshadowed by the abortion debate. 
Hopefully a collective desire to move forward on these challenging 
issues will prevail at the 2018 UNCPD. 
